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I. INTRODUCTION
In a truly global world the question "where do children come from?" asks
for more than biological and theological answers. Approximately fifteen to
twenty thousand children each year leave their nations of birth to be raised by
adoptive parents in another country.' The U.S. is by far the largest recipient
of this multicultural exchange of children. 2 The U.S. is, however, also a
nation from which a small, unidentified number of children are removed each
year to be adopted and raised in another country Personal and legal
dilemmas arise when an unwed biological father wants to raise his child, but
the unwed birth mother wants to place the child for adoption. 4 Faced with this
conflict, some unmarried biological mothers are placing their children for
adoption in provinces of Canada that are less likely to require the consent of
biological fathers than the state from which the mother fled. 5 Whether such
adoptions should proceed without the father's consent is a concrete legal
question that requires an immediate, concrete legal answer.

1. Peter H. Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purpose,
Implementation, and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 75 (1994) (citing 1993 statistics).
2. Id. Canada is also a significant recipient. In 1991, approximately 2,448 intercountry
adoptions occurred in Canada. As of 1992, it is estimated that for every two infants adopted from
within Canada, three others were adopted from international origins. Mark Eade, Intercountry
Adoption:International,NationalandCulturalConcerns,57 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 381 (1993)
(citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, HIGHLIGHTS FROM
"ADOPTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR INFERTILE COUPLES: PROSPECTS AND TRENDS" 5 (1992)).

3. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 72.
4. Kim Lunman, L.A. Lawyer Fast-TracksAdoptions, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 13, 1994,
at A8 (noting that five U.S. fathers unsuccessfully sought custody in Canada where their children
had been placed with prospective adoptive parents). See infra text accompanying notes 161-69.
5. See Lunman, supra note 4, at Al (citing admission of one U.S. attorney that he placed
forty infants in Alberta when the unwed father opposed the unwed mother's adoption decision,
taking advantage of that province's lesser protections for unwed fathers). See infra text
accompanying notes 152-69.
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Differences between adoption consent laws in the United States and
Canada also raise larger questions about the role of international law. This
concrete family law problem is a perfect example of the need for international
legal perspectives and solutions when domestic problems take on global
proportions. In a truly global world the question "where does law come
from?" asks for answers in multiple dimensions that take into account both
international and domestic law. We must define the appropriate relationship
between international and domestic law. This is the cutting edge of legal
change in a world where legal ideas must cross borders as freely as goods,
services, and now babies.
When we recognize the relationship between different levels of protection
given unwed fathers among nations and intercountry adoption, we can identify
both practical legal problems and complex policy choices. Legal scholars and
jurists in the U.S. have written extensively on the problem of the rights of
unwed fathers in adoption.6 There has been much less attention paid to the
role of international law in this difficult area.
To address the problem of intercountry flight from unwed fathers' rights
from the perspective of international law, this article first looks to the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption for solutions.7 Solutions provided by the
Hague Convention are helpful in the context of both intercountry and domestic
adoption. They prevent intercountry flight and provide models for domestic
law reform. Reform is necessary on a deeper level to move beyond outdated
ideas about parental rights and children's "best interests." It is time to reframe
the question in terms of the rights of children. International law gives us the
material from which to forge a domestic right of a child to be raised by a
biological parent who is willing, able, and fit to assume parenthood from the
moment of birth. Recognition and protection of this international right in
domestic law will avoid or lessen the effects of separation traumas that arise
in contested adoptions. It will also generate momentum for a fusion of
domestic and international law in a new, synergistic jurisprudence of children's
rights. Just as families are connecting across borders, the law must make
fundamental connections between domestic and international spheres to reflect
the global nature of human rights. At the heart of any adoption is a child with
an international legal persona that domestic law should not ignore.
The complex legal question of the rights of unwed fathers to consent to
the adoption of their children reached the American public most dramatically
in the case of "Baby Jessica" in 1993. A horrified public watched as a tearful
toddler was wrenched from the arms of the only parents she had ever known.'

6. See cases discussed in section II-A and articles discussed infra notes 317-19.
7. Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
8. Desda Moss, Anguished Goodbye/Jessica in Seclusion with Parents,USA ToDAY, Aug.
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The legal system had awarded custody to the child's biological parents after
a two year legal battle in two states between the biological and prospective
adoptive parents. 9
The scenario was repeated in 1994 when a sobbing four-year-old "Baby
Richard" was returned to his biological parents."0 The birth mother had
consented to the adoption, but the biological father had not. Of course, the
couple was not married at the time of the birth. The father, however,
intervened in the adoption proceeding within two months of the birth. The
prospective adoptive parents with whom the child had been placed fought long,
arduous legal battles that they eventually lost. 1
What many people in the U.S. did not know was that a similar scenario
had been played out in Canada in 1993. "Baby Boy M," a child of unwed
U.S. parents, had been placed for adoption by his biological mother in the
province of Alberta. 2 His biological father, a resident of Mississippi, waged
a long legal battle for custody in the Canadian courts, but the result was
different."' The trial court decided that it was in the best interest of the child
to remain in the only home he had ever known.' 4 The Alberta Court of
Appeal affirmed the decision.'" The Supreme Court of Canada refused to
hear the father's appeal, leaving the child in the custody of his adoptive
family. 16
Public awareness of the potential for emotionally scarring and financially
crippling litigation over the issue of an unwed father's consent to an adoption
in the United States has contributed to two new situations that raise two
different but interrelated legal problems. First, biological mothers wishing to
avoid obstacles to the speedy adoption of their children are fleeing the country
either to give birth or place their child for adoption just after birth in foreign

3, 1993, at IA; Desda Moss, Child's Painful Parting/JessicaHanded to Birth Parents, USA
TODAY, Aug. 3, 1993, at 3A; Baby Jessica,Swap Case, Spotlight Legal Failures,Ltd. Reuters
N. Am. Wire, Aug. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
9. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.),
stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993).
10. Boy Moves In With NaturalParents, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 1, 1995, at IA.
11. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. deniedsub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S.Ct. 499
(1994); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S.Ct.
2599 (1995) (amicus curie granted).
12. For a narrative report of the case see Kim Lunman, "WouldIEver Want My Dad to Give
Up on Me?," CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 11, 1994, at A1O.
13. U.S. Dad Wants Son Returnedfrom Calgary, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 1, 1994, at H7.
14. S. (J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L. R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993).
15. D. (H.A.) v. M. (N.C.), 145 A.R. 200 (C.A. 1993) (per curian), aff'g sub nom.
S. (J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L. R. 3rd 395 (Q.B. 1993).
16. D. (H.A.) v. M. (N.C.), 145 A.R. 200 (C.A. 1993) (per curiam), aff'g sub nom.
S. (J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L. R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993), appeal refused, Doc. 23915 (Can.
Mar. 3, 1994), 1 R.F.L. 4th 60.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/3
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jurisdictions providing lesser protections to unwed fathers. 17 This, in effect,
circumvents the levels of protection for paternal rights that U.S. states have
chosen to grant in light of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional
status of paternal liberty interests outside of marriage. 8 A dramatic illustration of the problem was a December 1995 West Virginia jury award of over
$7 million in damages to an unwed father against an adoption attorney, the
birth mother, and her family for conspiring to deprive the father of his rights
by placing the extramarital child for adoption in Canada. 9
The second situation involves prospective adoptive parents who temporarily leave the country to adopt children in foreign jurisdictions with lesser legal
constraints on adoption. In particular, these prospective adoptive parents mean
to avoid the rights of unwed fathers which might otherwise threaten the
stability of the new family bond that they are trying to establish between
themselves and a child.' This legal incentive to choose intercountry adoption
pressures prospective adoptive parents to take a course of action that
complicates the process with barriers of distance, language, culture, two legal
systems, immigration hurdles, and all the attendant, additional costs. The
pressured choice of intercountry adoption also takes prospective adoptive
parents out of the pool
of parents available to adopt children in need of homes
21
in the United States.
This article will focus first on two practical legal problems raised by
international flight from unwed fathers' rights. The first is circumvention of
U.S. law. To the extent that the United States is committed to the protection
of paternal rights over alternative legal choices such as speedy adoption
regardless of paternal consent, this article will address what measures exist in
international law to prevent effective nullification of those rights through

17. See Lunman, supra note 4.
18. See section II-A infra.
19. Jon D. Markman, Jury Rulesfor Unwed Fatherin Landmark Adoption Case, THE Los
ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at B1. The father sued for damages after an unsuccessful attempt
to gain guardianship of his child in Canada. See id.
20. According to U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics, U.S. parents
adopting children from China rose from 28 in 1990 to 748 in 1994. The director of the National
Adoption Clearinghouse in Maryland stated in an interview that many prospective adoptive
parents did not want to adopt domestically because of the Baby Jessica idea and were choosing
intercountry adoption to avoid the chance of becoming a Baby Jessica situation. Benjamin
Marrison, Americans Flock to Adopt in China, THE TMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 27, 1995, at A18.
See also Ellen Warren & Louise Kiernan, New 'Richard'LawsFailto QuellDoubts, CHI. TRin.,
May 3, 1995, at 1D (supporting above reasoning for choosing intercountry adoption).
21. A survey by the Michigan Federation of Private Child and Family Agencies found a
decline in domestic adoptions in that state from 2194 in 1993 to 1918 in 1994. The associate
director of the federation speculated that fears generated by the Baby Jessica case may have
discouraged prospective adoptive parents, thus contributing to the 12.6% decline. Around the
Region, DET. NEWS, Aug. 18, 1995, at D3.
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intercountry adoption. The second problem surfaces in both domestic and
intercountry adoption when an unwed father contests an adoption. The problem
is the harm to the child posed by protracted litigation which everyone concedes
is a traumatic event: separation from the prospective adoptive parents, home,
and family. I propose that existing international measures to prevent this harm
could be used as a model for domestic courts and legislatures grappling with
the problem of paternal consent in the United States.
Broadening the discussion, this article will then address the extent to
which international law can shed light on whether the United States should be
committed to the protection of paternal rights over alternative legal choices.
U.S. courts and legislatures have made a grave error in their resolution of the
question of consent in the adoption of children born out of wedlock. Looking
for the answer to adoptability in an analysis of the rights of unwed biological
fathers has caused personal harm in individual cases and created systemic legal
problems with domestic and international dimensions. Emerging international
law on the rights of children in the context of adoption has developed a
framework on which the U.S. can build better procedural and substantive legal
structures that bypass domestic adoption problems, prevent international flight,
and redirect domestic law toward the protection of children.'
The lens of paternal rights has distorted the two most essential questions
in adoption: to what extent should the law protect the biological bond between
parent and child and for what reasons? After looking directly at the rights of
children emerging incrementally from international conventions and U.N.
resolutions, it should become clear that nations can best recognize the
biological bond with the least legal, social, and individual damage by building
a domestic jurisprudence around the rights of children to be raised by
biological parents if one or both are willing, able, and fit to assume that
responsibility from the moment of birth. As adoption enters its third century
in U.S. law, it is time to recalculate the rights equation.
II.UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS IN ADOPTION: THE COMPARATIVE PROBLEM

There is a spectrum of legal possibilities to consider when a jurisdiction
is faced with the problem of what level of protection to afford unwed fathers
in the adoption context. At one end, fathers could have an absolute right to
veto mothers' choices to place their child for adoption. At the other end,
mothers could have complete autonomy over the decision. These "absolute"
positions create fewer legal uncertainties than intermediate choices along the
22. Legal scholars and even the medical profession have called for "the exchange and sharing
of experiences, knowledge, and ideas among countries." Panos Palmos, quoted in ADOPTION:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVS xi-xii (Euthymia D. Hibbs ed. 1991). I argue here for a different
remedy, but with the same conviction that domestic reform lies in the example of international
law.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/3
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spectrum. The difficulty in choosing the level of protection to afford unwed
fathers in adoptions is reflected in the vague and uncertain rules that have
emerged in the last few years in the United States.'I
Uncertainty as to status and power in the adoption process creates legal
and personal problems for all parties involved. For biological mothers and
prospective adoptive parents, there is the legal and emotional risk that the
autonomy of their adoption decisions may be undercut if a biological father
attempts to withhold consent. For the biological father, there is a similar
problem of uncertainty as to what the law may require of him before it will
recognize his right to withhold consent. The standards for measuring paternal

behavior may not afford a ready answer as to whether the father has met the
test.24 Ignorance of the law at a critical juncture may strip him of everything
but the mere status of biological fatherhood.' For the child, there is a
dilemma of Biblical proportions. Caught between a biological father who wants
to raise her and a biological mother who wants adoptive parents to raise her,
she faces the pain of choices made by her elders. A speedy adoption may place
her in a loving, stable home, but it may also place her, in most cases, beyond
the possibility of a relationship with either of her biological parents.26

23. See infra section lI-B.
24. Although filing a legal action requesting a declaration of paternity and custody may be
clear evidence, recent tests also afford less obvious, less quantifiable actions by which unwed
fathers may demonstrate sufficient commitment to a child to merit full parental rights, including
the right to withhold consent. See, e.g., the discussion of the New York test in the text
accompanying notes 63-71.
25. See, e.g, discussion regarding New York's six month period for vesting of inchoate
paternal rights in the text accompanying notes 68-69. Failure to take action to vest full paternal
rights differs from failure to take action to vest the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
in the adoption process. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Supreme Court refused
to vacate an adoption because the biological father had failed to file a notice of paternity with the
New York putative father registry. He was unaware of the registry, but his ignorance did not
prevent application of the law that required notice and an opportunity to be heard only to certain
classes of unwed fathers. See id. See discussion of this case in text infra accompanying notes 5057.
26. Open adoption, whereby the state does not conceal the identity of the birth parents, or
where birth parents retain some connection with their child after adoption, is a controversial
exception, rather than the norm, in U.S. statutory adoption schemes. ANN M. HARALAMBiE,
HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 14.21 (1993). For example, New
York requires the sealing of adoption records. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1988 &
Supp. 1997). It allows open adoption only in certain cases involving children in foster care whose
parents would not grant consent without retaining the right to continue a relationship with the
child. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-c (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997).
Another obstacle to a relationship arises from time limits for when a proceeding to open an
adoption decree may be brought. If a father learns too late of his paternity or does not meet the
statutory grounds for attacking the decree, he loses the opportunity for a relationship. For
example, Oregon, like many states, places a one year time limit on direct or collateral attack on
an adoption decree. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.381(3) (1995). In 1995, the Oregon Court ofAppeals
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Protracted custody litigation may result in the same end, but it also may result
in custody for her biological parent(s) long after she has psychologically
bonded to her adoptive parents. 27 Of course, protracted litigation has financial
and emotional costs for all parties, but at least the adults have some control
over those costs. The child has none.
In federal systems such as the United States and Canada, the different
choices made by the individual states and provinces create additional problems.
Biological mothers and prospective adoptive parents may shop for a jurisdiction which favors them in the adoption process. Favoritism may come in many
forms, such as clearer rules as to when a biological father may contest the
adoption, 8 fewer opportunities for a biological father to contest the adoption, 9 a preference for certain family configurations, 3" or a balancing of
interests that favors the adoptive parents the longer the child stays with them
pending litigation.31

dismissed a filiation petition brought by an unwed father whose consent to the adoption had not
been obtained, citing that statutory provision. Chamberlain v. Williams, 895 P.2d 805 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995). See also infra text accompanying notes 42-77. For an exhaustive overview of
statutory limits of this type extant in 1993 see Alexandra R. DaPolito, The FailureTo Notify
PutativeFathers ofAdoption Proceedings:BalancingThe Adoption Equation, 42 CATH. U. L.
REv. 979, 999 n.126 (1993).
27. Baby Richard was four years old when he was transferred from his prospective adoptive
parents to his biological parents. This was well after the point at which child psychologists
recognize a tie between a child and a "psychological parent," the one who has assumed

responsibility and continuity of care on a daily basis. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20, 32-33 (1973).

BEYOND THE

28. Compare New York's case law discussed in the text accompanying notes 63-76 with
Alberta's statutory law discussed in the text accompanying notes 142-43. The federal problem
arises in a purely domestic context as well. New York gives unwed fathers six months prior to
placement of a newborn to perfect their paternity rights. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
Nebraska allows them five days to file a notice of intent to claim paternity with respect to
newborns. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1995); Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, 385
N.W.2d 448 (1986).
29. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997) and 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12a (West Supp. 1995) (requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard
to various classes of unwed fathers regardless of eligibility to withhold consent) with Children &
Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, §§ 67(1)(f), 68(8), 74(3) (1990) (right to notice and
to withhold consent in Nova Scotia dependent on fitting legal definition of definition of "parent").
30. Compare In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing evolution of N.Y. state
statutory policy regarding adoption regardless of marital status or sexual orientation) with State
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that statutory ban on adoption by homosexuals is not unconstitutional).
31. Compare In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (stating that child's interest in
staying with prospective adoptive parents is not relevant) with Re R, 53 O.R.2d 54 (0. Dist. Ct.
1985) (dispensing with father's consent required at that time under Ontario law because it was
not in the child's best interest).
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This kind of forum selection has a legal impact on the biological father
who contests such an adoption. The force of the impact is increased if the
forum chosen by a biological mother is in another country. Biological fathers
who wish to raise their children may be prevented from doing so by the
complicating factors of distance, the expense and difficulty of litigating in a
foreign jurisdiction, and the different legal rules in those jurisdictions. Even
those who can afford the financial and emotional burdens of protracted
international litigation may still lose the right to maintain a relationship with
their progeny if the foreign jurisdiction affords fewer protections than U.S.
law.
Forum selection also has an impact on the child placed for adoption in a
jurisdiction remote from a biological parent wishing to raise her. Like the
infant before Solomon, the child would be subject to the decisions of the
potential parents and the adjudicator. The international aspect of the situation
may amplify the possible pain of these decisions. If the child is placed with
prospective adoptive parents who lose the legal battle after a lengthy period,
she will be faced with separation from a culture and possibly even a language.
This is in addition to the loss of an individual identity that is linked to the
bond with her prospective adoptive parents. On the other hand, if her adoption
becomes final, the severance from her biological parent becomes exacerbated
by international distance. Upon attaining the age of majority, the child may
attempt to locate her biological parent and pursue an adult relationship. She
may be confounded in that attempt by the formidable barriers of two different
and distant legal systems, the financial and physical difficulties of piercing the
adoptive veil across borders, and the sheer obstacle of geography.
In recent years, the specter of intrusion by the biological father into the
adoption decision and process has provided an incentive for intercountry
adoption. Most cases involve U.S. biological mothers choosing to place their
children for adoption in Canada. The geographical proximity and cultural
affinity are convenient. Certain provinces, such as Alberta, provide fewer
opportunities for the biological father "to prevent the adoption.32 In addition,
there is a relative unavailability of certain Canadian infants for adoption. 3
While Canada is not the only jurisdiction posing a "haven" for international

32. See infra at Part I-B-1.
33. See statistics cited by Eade, supra note 2. In Alberta, the waiting period for healthy,
white newborns ranges from two to ten years, depending on whether the adoption proceeds
through a private, licensed agency or the provincial government. See Lunman, supra note 4
at Al.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:497

flight from the threats posed by U.S. law on unwed fathers' rights,34 it is the

nation to which U.S. parties most often look."
This section will first briefly set out selected U.S. law on the rights of
unwed fathers to withhold consent to adoption of their biological children,
focusing most particularly on states where bitter legal battles have been waged

over this issue. It will proceed to offer for the reader's comparison the
differing approaches taken by some Canadian provinces. It will end with a
brief discussion of alternative means to solve the problem before turning, in
the next section, to a discussion of the better solution offered by the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption.
A. The United States
1. Unwed Fathers' Rights Under the Federal Constitution
The rights of unwed fathers in adoption are rooted firmly in jurisprudence
identifying the constitutional rights of parents and of unwed fathers outside the
context of adoption. In 1923 the Supreme Court3 6 articulated a fundamental
right residing in parents, the liberty to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. This parental liberty found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two years later, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this constitutional right by striking down a statute requiring
parents to send children of a specified age to public school.3 7 Almost twenty
years later the Supreme Court announced that "lt is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," before

34. There are reports that the Cayman Islands serve a similar function. Kim Lunman, "Would
lEver Want My Dad to Give Up on Me?, " CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 11, 1994, at A10.Although
there have been no reports of the use of New Zealand as an "adoption haven," New Zealand
presents another possibility. It is part of the English-speaking, common-law world to which an
English-speaking, U.S. biological mother may logically turn despite its geographical distance.
There is no clear test for unwed fathers' consents, with judges apparently being given discretion
to require consent if it is "expedient," such as where the parents have a stable, rather than casual,
relationship. [Commentary 1] Fain. L. Serv. (Butterworth, July 1995) § 6.707. Moreover, New
Zealand was the haven for a famous case of flight from paternal rights, albeit outside the context
of adoption. Michael Cromwell & Mark Vane, Morgan Awarded Custody, THE WAsH. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1990, at B1.Dr. Morgan won custody of her daughter in a New Zealand court after
being jailed in the U.S. for contempt for refusing to abide by court-ordered visitation for her exhusband who she alleged was a child abuser and for refusing to reveal the child's whereabouts.
See id. The New Zealand decision is unreported.
35. A California attorney specializing in private placement of infants placed forty infants
whose mothers were from the U.S. with parents in Alberta before that province prohibited
adoptions involving private intermediaries. See Lunman, supra note 4 at Al.
36. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
instruction in a foreign language).
37. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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finding that the state may restrict parental control through enforcement of child
labor laws. 8
Eventually, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether
there was any difference between the liberty interest of a "parent" and that of
an unwed father. In Stanley v. Illinois,39 the Court's opinion defined the
parental liberty interest as encompassing "the companionship, care, custody,
and management of"- one's children. The Court held that an unwed father has
such an interest in the children he has sired and raised.' Justice White,
writing for the majority, characterized Mr. Stanley's interest in retaining
custody against a custodial claim by the state as "cognizable and substan41
tial."
Ensuing Supreme Court cases about the constitutional rights of unwed
fathers actually arose in the context of adoption. All involved challenges to a
mother's choice to have her child adopted by her husband (who was not the
biological father). None involved the mother's choice to have the child adopted
by strangers. 2 In Quilloin v. Walcott, 43 the Court upheld a Georgia statute
allowing adoption of a child without the consent of the biological father. In
that case the father had taken no action indicative of paternity prior to the
adoption petition, which the mother's new husband filed over eleven years
after the child's birth.' The father had neither supported nor legitimated the
child or even become a de facto member of the child's actual family unit.4'
Ultimately, the Court rejected the father's due process claim.4 6 In Caban v.

38. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (referencing id.).
39. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). In Stanley, the state of Illinois had removed Mr. Stanley's
children from his home under a statutory presumption that unwed fathers were unfit parents. The
precise holding of the case was that the State of Illinois denied Mr. Stanley equal protection of
the law in presuming him to be an unfit parent, while affording all other classes of parents a
hearing on the issue of neglect before the state assumed custody of the children. Id. at 658.
40. Id. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Court reined in the
constitutional rights that earlier decisions had seemed to delineate for unwed fathers. It refused
to recognize any fundamental liberty interest of an unwed father in his biological child born to
a mother while she was married to a man who later claimed a paternal interest in the child,
despite the intervening establishment of a relationship between the biological father and the child.
The Court rested its decision on historical, legal protection for the marital family. Id.
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
42. Although none of these cases involved adoption by strangers, in a note in Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 n.19 (1983), the Court hinted that protection of a family unit
already in existence undercut the paternal claims. It stated, however, that the father's right to
object to both types of adoption, stepparent and stranger, was at least equal. Id.
43. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
44. Id. at 247.
45. Id. at 252-53.
46. Id. at 254. "IThis is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought,
actual or legal custody of his child .... [Tihe result of the adoption in this case is to give full
recognition to a family unit already in existence .... " Id. at 255. Thus, the situation was quite

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:497

Mohammed,4 7 a biological father who had actually served as a parent
challenged a judicial order of adoption, again by the mother's new husband.
He prevailed, but the Court did not reach the question of a father's liberty
interest in his children. Instead, the Court decided the case on the basis of
equal protection. Requiring only an unwed mother's consent to adoption was
held to be a violation.4 8
Later, in Lehr v. Robertson,49 the Supreme Court reached the question
of whether an unwed father's due process rights afforded him a liberty interest
strong enough to defeat the adoption of his children. Jonathan Lehr, like the
father in Quilloin, had not acted as a father in the two years between the
child's birth and the order granting her stepfather's adoption petition."0 The
Court found the distinction between the parental behavior of Stanley and
Caban, on the one hand, and the mere biological bond common to Quilloin,
Lehr, and their children, on the other, to be dispositive.5 ' The mere fact of
biological paternity does not confer an interest in the child that the Constitution will protect. 2 The Court was persuaded that a biological father who has
played a substantial role in rearing his children has a greater claim to
constitutional protection than a mere biological parent. 3 Only when an
unwed father grasps his unique opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child and assumes some parental responsibilities will the Due Process Clause
protect that father's interest in maintaining personal contact with his child.54
The issue in Lehr then became whether the state's legislation concerning
notification of putative fathers that adoption proceedings were pending denied
the biological father the opportunity to form a relationship that the Constitution
would protect.55 The decision was that New York had adequately protected
an unwed father's constitutionally inchoate liberty interest in assuming a
responsible role in his child's future by setting up a putative fathers registry.5 That is, registration would automatically entitle a father to notice and
an opportunity to be heard57 concerning the adoption that would sever his
hope of a relationship.

different than that in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
47. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
48. Id. at 394.

49. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). Mr. Lehr also made an equal protection claim. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262 n.18.
Id. at 262.
Id.at 262-63.
Id. at 264-65.
Id.
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Due process for unwed fathers requires that state law provide an adequate

opportunity for them to claim paternity and take responsibility for their
children in a timely manner before adoption. The cases, thus, implicitly
recognize that limits on procedural protections for unwed fathers are necessary
from the perspective of the child who needs a prompt and stable start in life.
2. State Levels of Protectionfor Unwed Fathers' PaternalLiberty Interests
In Lehr's wake, there has been much litigation centered on exactly when
an unwed father's inchoate parental interest matures into a full constitutional
right, such that the father may withhold his consent and defeat any adoption
of his child. Fathers have challenged state legislative choices setting various
thresholds for the maturation of such veto power.5" New York, in particular,
became the site of groundbreaking common law adjudication regarding the
constitutionality of these legislative thresholds.
New York had enacted varying legislative thresholds to govern when
consent to an adoption is required.59 Generally, the thresholds varied
according to the age at which the child was placed for adoption.' For
children born "out of wedlock"6 ' and placed before the age of six months,
New York required the unwed father's consent, but only if he had fulfilled

58. Indiana's statutory scheme is an example of those which limit the rights of unwed fathers
and invite challenge. Specifically, the Indiana Code requires that unwed fathers file with the
putative father registry no later than thirty days after the birth ofthe child or the date of adoption,
whichever is later, to preserve their right to withhold consent. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-1.5
to -12, 33-3-16 (Michie Supp. 1996). On the other end of the spectrum, statutes like Pennsylvania's which require the unmitigated consent of unwed fathers in all cases, see 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2711(A)(3) (1995), would seem to avoid suits on the biological father's initiative. For
a thorough review of the range of state statutes regarding consent extant in 1993 see Alexandra
R. DaPolito, Comment, The Failure To Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings:
Balancing The Adoption Equation, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 979, 990 & n.71 (1993).
In addition to the successful challenges discussed hereafter in the text and accompanying
notes, unsuccessful challenges to such laws include, but are not limited to the following: In re
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-1 14487, 876 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1994)
(en banc); In re Baby Boy C., 581 A.2d 1141 (D.C. 1990), cert. deniedsub nom. H.R. v. E. 0.,
115 S.Ct. 58 (1994); In reAdoption ofBaby E.A.W. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995), cert.
deniedsub nom. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 116 S.Ct. 719 (1996); In reAdoption ofDoe, 543 So. 2d 741
(Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v. Doe, 493 U.S. 964 (1989); Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d
1312 (Miss. 1982); In re Baby Girl K., 335 N.W.2d 846 (Wis. 1983), appeal dismissed, sub
nom. Buhse v. Krueger, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984). Butsee In re Application of S.R.S., 408 N.W.2d
272 (Neb. 1987) (holding as unconstitutional the requirement of filing notice of intent to claim
paternit within five days of birth as a predicate to consent, when applied to a developed
relationship between an unwed father and his two-year-old child).
59. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
60. Id. at § 111(e) (f).
61. This is the terminology the statute employs. I prefer the terms "extramarital" or
"nonmarital," as they are less anachronistic.
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three criteria by which New York judged him to be an actual parent as
opposed to a mere biological father:
(i) such father openly lived with the child or the child's mother for a
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the placement of
the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held himself out to be
the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such father paid a fair
and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for the medical,
hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the mother's
pregnancy or with the birth of the child.62
The legislature had chosen these specific criteria in lieu of a less concrete
criterion stated in terms of manifestation of parental interest and assumption
of parental obligations.63
In 1990 the court of appeals decided In re Raquel Marie X. and found
the part of New York's consent statute requiring an unwed father to live with
the unwed mother to be unconstitutional. The requirement was only tangentially related to the fully responsible parental relationship that Lehr placed at the
heart of an unwed father's constitutional rights.' Moreover, it granted a
mother the ability to block a father's willingness to become a responsible
parent by refusing to live with him during their child's infancy. 6 While
finding the other two statutory requirements to be in furtherance of a
legitimate state objective, the court, nevertheless, declared the entire provision
invalid.67 The court then went on to fashion its own consent standard to be
used until the legislature chose to act.68

62. N.Y. DoM. RL. LAW § I1(e) (McKinney 1988).

63. 1980 N.Y. Laws 1672, 1673-74 (stating the Recommendation of the Law Rev. Comm'n
to the 1980 Legislature Relating to the Rights of Fathers in the Adoption of Children Born out
of Wedlock).
64. 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.), cert. denied, sub nom. Robert C. v. Miguel T., 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
65. Id. at 426-27.
66. Id. at 426.

67. The court found that the legislative intent indicated that the two remaining criteria should
not stand alone. Id. at 426-27.
68. The Supreme Court of California relied, inter alia, on Raquel Marie X. in finding an

analogous California provision as to the necessity of consent of unwed fathers unconstitutional
as applied. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228-29 (Cal. 1992). California's adoption
consent statutes distinguished between a "presumed father," who had received a child into his
home and held it out as his natural child, and a "natural father," who did not meet this threshold
for presumptive paternity. A presumed father's consent was required unless his parental rights
had been terminated on the grounds of abandonment or unfitness. A natural father did not have
the right to withhold his consent to an adoption; the court would simply have to determine if it
was in the child's best interest that he be given custody rather than the prospective adoptive
parents. The Supreme Court of California found this scheme constitutionally invalid. The court
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The Raquel Marie X. consent standard in New York for an unwed father
of a child placed for adoption within six months of birth is that a father must
manifest his parental responsibility within the six month period preceding the
child's placement by showing a willingness to assume full custody. 69 The
court chose that six-month period mainly because the legislature had chosen
it in the two constitutionally valid parts of the statute.70 Relevant considerations are whether the father has publicly acknowledged paternity, paid
pregnancy and birth expenses, taken steps to establish a legal relationship with
the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child. 71 In the
companion case of Baby Girl S., the court found that the father had met this
test by seeking to establish legal paternity and obtain custody, offering support
to the mother and child, and doing everything within his means to establish a
parental relationship as soon as he learned of the pregnancy, despite the
mother's objections.'
Two years later the New York Court of Appeals applied this consent
standard to a case in which the unwed father had been unaware of the
existence of his child until well after the six month period for taking action
had passed.73 As soon as he learned of his paternity, however, the unwed
father took legal steps to assert paternal rights.7' At that point, the child, who

stated that the correct standard was the prompt demonstration of a full commitment to parental
responsibilities both before and after the birth as evidenced by any relevant factors including
public acknowledgment of paternity, payment ofpregnancy, and birth expenses within his means,
and legal action to obtain custody. Id.
The supreme court clarified the Kelsey S. standard in Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d
891 (Cal. 1995), cert. deniedsub nom. Mark K. v. John S., 116 S.Ct. 1272 (1996), in which the
father's failure to demonstrate full parental commitment as soon as he knew of the pregnancy
prevented him from having a veto over the adoption.
From Kelsey S. we see most sharply how the replacement of an easily applied, clearly
delineated legislative test with a constitutionally sound but inherently amorphous judicial test
leaves the public with less guidance as to what is expected of it and what it can expect from the
legal system when an adoption is being considered. Practically, lower courts can be expected to
differ greatly in their interpretation of what conduct is adequate to ensure that a father's rights
vest and what conduct is inadequate to confirm that a father's rights have failed to vest. In both
the New York and California cases, the major problem with the legislative test was that it gave
the mother a veto power, the power to block the father's attempts to behave in the manner
required to "grasp" his inchoate liberty interest. A better solution than the New York and
California judicial fabrications would be a clearly delineated legislativetest without a maternal
veto. After all, a legislature, far more easily than a court, could craft clear and constitutionally
permissible behavioral thresholds that give adequate notice to fathers and fair warning to mothers.
69. 559 N.E.2d at 428.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 428.
73. In re Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
74. Id. at 101.
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had been placed with his adoptive family within days of his birth, was already
eighteen months old, and the order of adoption had been final for ten
months.75 Despite the father's prompt response, the court of appeals declined
to vacate the final order of adoption. It held to a strict application of the time
period announced in Raquel Marie X. The father plainly had not manifested
his parental interest within the six months preceding the child's placement for
adoption. The court declined to make an exception because he was unaware
of his child's existence or the mother's pregnancy during that critical period.
The court reasoned that there was a need to demand prompt action from
fathers measured in terms of the baby's life, because the state had a legitimate
interest in a child's need for early permanence and stability.76 Thus, New
York demands that an unwed father take action to vest his inchoate constitutional parental liberty interest within six months preceding placement. Mere
unawareness of paternity will not preserve this constitutional right. The court
found that the biological father's failure to take action to discover the
pregnancy or birth, and not any fraud or concealment on the part of the
mother, was at the heart of his problemr 7 It was not willing to uproot the
then four-year-old child from the only home and family he had known.
The famous "Baby Jessica" was born to an unwed mother in Iowa in
1991.78 The mother and the man she named as the father signed consents to
adoption by a Michigan couple.79 During the course of adoption proceedings,
an Iowa court ordered termination of parental rights and awarded custody to
the prospective adoptive parents.' Less than three weeks after the baby's
birth, however, the mother informed the actual biological father of his possible
paternity." In response, he took immediate legal steps and ultimately
intervened in the adoption proceeding less than two months after the child's
birth." By that time, the child's mother had changed her mind and joined in
seeking to prevent the adoption. The juvenile court ruled, however, that
termination of her parental rights was effective. 3 The prospective adoptive
parents then sought termination of the biological father's rights. I The district
court denied the adoption and ordered the prospective adoptive parents to
surrender custody to the biological father, but the order was stayed pending

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 103-04 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 104.
In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992).
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 241, 246.
Id. at 244.
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appeal. The Supreme Court of Iowa eventually held that the adoption could
not take place, because Iowa's statute on termination set out specific grounds
that had not occurred and could not be circumvented by the best interest of the
child. s6 The court noted that Iowa statutes generally require a termination of
parental rights prior to the filing of an adoption petition." The court
specifically found that failure to take action prior to the birth and failure to
contribute to the expenses of the pregnancy and birth did not constitute
abandonment of the child under the circumstances of the case and that to find
otherwise would contravene a father's right to develop a parent-child
relationship.8" Without a termination of the father's parental rights on the
ground of abandonment (or other possible ground), the adoption simply could
not proceed. 9
The prospective adoptive parents refused to abide by the Iowa decision
and filed an action in their home state of Michigan seeking an order rejecting
or modifying the Iowa court decision.' Eventually, the Supreme Court of
Michigan decided that the Michigan courts had no jurisdiction over the claims
asserted and that the Iowa judgment would be enforced.91 The court rejected
the prospective adoptive parent's argument that the Iowa judgment was
unenforceable for failure to hold a hearing on the best interest of the child.'
At the end of the entire litigation process' the child was two and one half

85. Id. at 241.
86. Id. at 245.
87. Id. at 245-46; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 600.3(2), 600A.3 (West 1996). The current grounds
for termination, contained in § 600A.8, rather than § 600A.3, are, inter alia, abandonment,
release of custody, and failure to support without good cause. Id. at § 600A.8.
88. In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d at 241 n.1, 246.
89. Id. at 246.
90. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Mich. 1993).
91. Id. at 652.
92. Id. at 660-62. The court declined to state whether a Michigan court would need to hold
such a hearing in a similar situation, noting, however, that a best interests test would not apply
in proceedings under the Michigan statute regarding termination of a putative father's parental
rights. Id. at 661-62. That statute provides as follows:
if the putative father has established a custodial relationship with the child or has
provided support or care for the mother during pregnancy or for either mother or
child after the child's birth during the 90 days before notice of the hearing was served
upon him, the rights of the putative father shall not be terminated except by
proceedings [for abuse and neglect or for a stepparent adoption].
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.39(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). If the father does not meet
these statutory standards, then his rights may be terminated under the adoption code if the judge
conducting the hearing finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child to be given into
the custody of the father (even if the father appears at the hearing and objects to the adoption).
Id. Amendments in 1994 did not change the substance of the above provision. See id. at
§ 710.39(2) (West Supp. 1996).
93. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993) (denying applications to stay the enforcement
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years old and had lived her entire small life with the couple who wished to
adopt her.
The paternal consent 'standard at issue in the case concerning "Baby
Richard"94 lies in the Adoption Act of Illinois. That statute actually sets out
two different standards under which an unwed father may lose the right to
withhold his consent to an adoption.' Under section 8(a) the consent of the
father of a child born out of wedlock and placed for adoption within six
months of birth is required unless the father was informed of his paternity yet
failed to take specific steps to show a bona fide interest in the child, such as
openly living with the child, holding himself out as father of the child, paying
for medical expenses, or visiting the child. Under section 8(a) the rights of a
parent whose consent is required may not be terminated unless the parent is
found to be unfit.96 Section I(D) of the Adoption Act defines when a parent
may be unfit for this purpose.' Section I(D)(1) declares a parent unfit where
the parent fails to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during the first 30 days
after its birth.9" It was the latter provision that was at issue in Baby Richard's
case, decided under the name In re Doe.99
In Doe, the trial court terminated the biological father's rights, because
he had not acted within the thirty-day period, and the appellate court affirmed
the decision."° The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, however, by
focusing on the fact that the father's unawareness of the child's existence and
placement for adoption fifty-seven days after birth stemmed from the
fraudulent actions of the mother and the attorney for the prospective adoptive
parents, rather than from the father's disinterest.' The father had inquired
persistently with the mother and her family about the child and had made some
attempts to locate the baby." 2 He was told that the child had died shortly

of the Michigan Supreme Court order).
94. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (11.), cert. denied sub nom. Doev. Kirchner, 115 S.Ct. 499
(1994); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (ill.), cert. deniedsub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S.Ct.
2599 (1995) (amicus curie granted).
95. 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 50/8(a) (West Supp. 1996). The legislative amendments of
50/8(a) after the Illinois Supreme Court decision in this case did not change the provisions at
issue in the case, although they did change the legislative threshold for when an unwed father's
consent is necessary for adoption of an infant placed before six months of age. Section 50/8(a)
still does not require the consent of an unfit parent. See id. The fitness of the father in Doe was
the primary issue.
96. Id.
97. 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D) (West 1996).
98. Id.
99. 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id.
102. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/3

18

Maravel: Intercountry Adoption and the Flight from Unwed Fathers' Rights:
1997]

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

after the birth.1 °3 The attorney for the adoptive parents made no effort to
ascertain the father's name or address, despite requirements under Illinois law
that he
04 make a good faith effort to notify the father of an adoption proceeding.,

In fact, the evidence showed that the father had no opportunity to
discharge his familial duty. 0" Thus, the trial court's termination of the
father's rights due to unfitness was not warranted. The supreme court also
found that the appellate court's focus on the best interest of the child was not
appropriate because termination of parental rights was the only relevant
issue.' In a much longer concurring opinion, the court indicated that the
lower appellate court had thought that the father acted insufficiently in
manifesting a reasonable interest in the child during the thirty day period after
birth."'1 The lower court faulted the father for failing to make adequate
inquiries. Specifically, the court of appeals noted that he did not force a
confrontation to speak with the mother directly, contact the prenatal physician
whose identity was known to him, or use the legal system. 8 The supreme
court concurring opinion states that the father's efforts were neither so
insufficient nor insincere that he should be deprived of his parental interests
in his son. 'I The concurring justice did not attempt to define the lowest
threshold for genuine efforts to manifest the statutorily required interest in a
newborn. Both opinions by the supreme court rest heavily on the misrepresentations and attempts by the mother and the adoptive parents to block the
biological father from asserting parental rights and interfering with the
adoption." 0 Therefore, the actual standard for paternal behavior is unclear.
Baby Richard's father filed an appearance contesting the adoption of his
son as soon as he discovered that the child was alive, fifty-seven days after the
boy's birth."' The adoptive parents chose to litigate. When they lost, the
child was over three years old. The effect on the child of separation had been
addressed at the lower appellate level where a best interest analysis weighed
heavily in favor of the adoption."' After rejecting the relevance of a best
interest analysis the supreme court faulted the adoptive parents for litigating
at the child's expense rather than relinquishing custody when the child was still
very young. 113
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 181,
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183,
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 182,
Id. at 182.
In re Doe,
In re Doe,

187.

187.

187.
627 N.E.2d 648, 653 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
638 N.E.2d at 182. In one of its opinions denying petitions for rehearing,
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The Baby Richard case illustrates the struggle of courts in dealing with
issues left open by legislatures in this contentious area of the law. As the lone
dissenter to a denied petition for rehearing noted, the decision whether the use
of a parental rights doctrine over a best interest doctrine is appropriate in cases

for4 a significant period of time is
where a child has lived in a particular home 11
a decision for the legislature, not the courts.
B. Canada
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' accords fundamental
liberties that bear upon the morass of "rights" that may be implicated in the
context of adoption of children born outside of marriage. Persons of both sexes
have the right to liberty in the context of rules of fundamental justice as well
as the right to equality and equal protection before the law without discrimination based upon sex." 6 These rights are not absolute and may be subject to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society." 7
In contrast with the United States, the Supreme Court of Canada has not
yet handed down its interpretation of how the rights delineated under the
Charter shape the claims and interests of unwed fathers in the adoption
context."' The issue of conflict between the Charter and provincial legislation concerning paternal consent to adoption of children born outside of
marriage has, however, reached some provincial courts." 9

the supreme court again emphasized that the prospective adoptive parents were at fault, as they
had wrongfully attempted to deprive a father of his child. Id. at 187, 188. That opinion reacted
sharply to the sting of criticism in the media to the court's decision. Id. at 189.
114. Id. at 191, 192.
115. CAN. CONST. pt. 1 (1982) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [hereinafter
Charter].
116. Id. §§ 7, 15(1).
117. Id. § 1.
118. The court refused to hear the biological father's appeal in the fairly recent case of Baby
Boy M. S. (LW.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L.R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993), aff'd sub noma. D. (H.A.)
v. M. (N.C.), 145 A.R. 200 (C.A. 1993) (per curiam), appealrefused, Doe. 23915 (Can. Mar.
3, 1994), 1 R.F.L. 4th 60.
119. Although the legislation differs among provinces, the allegations of Charter violations
have rested largely on the differing treatment afforded men and women. In two cases, Ontario
and Nova Scotia courts held that there was no violation of the equal protection provision, section
15 of the Charter. T. (D.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y & Family Servs., 92 D.L.R.4th 289 (NSSC,
App. Div. 1992); S.(C.E.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 64 O.R.2d 311 (OHC 1988). The Ontario
court noted, however, that to the extent any violation of section 15 might be found, section 1
might authorize differing consent standards for mothers and fathers as a limitation reasonably
based on the interests of the children. S. (C.E.), 64 O.R.2d at 318. A court in British Columbia
held, on the other hand, that the provincial consent provisions applicable to unwed fathers
violated section 15 through distinctions based on sex and marital status. Re MacVicar &
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As the following examples of decisional and statutory law will bear out,
no province grants all unwed fathers the right to withhold consent to the
adoption of their children. Likewise, no province absolutely denies unwed
fathers any opportunity to withhold consent. Between these two points on the
spectrum of possibilities there is a range of legal positions as to when an
unwed father's consent is required. There are also varying standards for
determining when an unwed father is entitled to notice and an opportunity to
be heard in an adoption proceeding. In most provinces, however, provisions
establishing the interest of the child as paramount allow, either explicitly or
implicitly, for consideration of any relationship that may have developed
between father and child.
The following very limited description of provincial law will highlight the
difference between Canadian and U.S. legal approaches. It will also explain
further the history of and potential for intercountry flight from unwed fathers.
1
In 1995 British Columbia completely revised its adoption law. 2
Prospective adoptive parents currently must make reasonable efforts to give
notice of the proposed adoption to anyone who has registered in a birth
fathers' registry created by the new law and anyone named by the birth mother
as the birth father, if his consent is not required under the new law.12 1 The
prospective adoptive parents must also make reasonable efforts to obtain all
necessary consents under the law." The new law requires the father's
consent to an adoption, but defines "father" for this purpose as anyone who:
has acknowledged paternity by signing the birth registration; is or was the
child's guardian or joint guardian with the mother; has acknowledged paternity
and has custody or access rights to the child by court order or agreement; has
acknowledged paternity and has supported, maintained or cared for the child,
either voluntarily or under court order; has acknowledged paternity and is
named by the birth mother as the birth (biological) father; or has been
acknowledged by the birth mother as the birth father and has registered on the
birth fathers' registry as the child's father."n However, if the child is placed
under the guardianship of the Superintendent of Family and Child Services,
only the Superintendent's consent is required, unless the child is of an age
where her own consent is also required. 14 Moreover, if an adoption agency
outside the province places the child within the province, and the law of the

Superintendent of Family & Child Servs., 34 D.L.R.4th 488 (BCSC 1986).
120. Adoption Act, Bill 51-1995, S.B.C., ch. 48, §§ 1- 121 (royal assent granted, July 6,
1995).
121. S.B.C., ch.48, at§ 9(d). The court may dispensewithnoticeupon application, however,
if it is in the child's best interest to do so or the circumstances justify dispensing with notice. Id.
at § 11(1).

122. Id. § 9(d).
123. Id. § 13(1), (2).
124. Id. § 13(3).
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other province requires only the agency's consent to the adoption, then British
Columbia will require only the consent of that agency and the child if she is
at least twelve, the age of consent for adoption." z The court may dispense
with any required consent, including the father's, if the court is satisfied that
it is in the child's best interests to do so or that the person whose consent is
required is incapable of giving informed consent, cannot be located after
reasonable search has been made, "has abandoned or deserted the child, . . .
has not made reasonable efforts to meet their parental obligations to the
child, . . . is [in]capable of caring for the child, or other circumstances justify
dispensing with consent."126 The adoption law sets out specific criteria for
use by a court considering the best interests of the child. 27 These include,
inter alia, the effect on the child of a delay in the decision, "the importance
of continuity in the child's care," the importance of "a positive relationship
with a parent and a secure place" in a family, and "the quality of the
relationship [a] . . . child has [had] with a birth parent" and the effect of
maintaining that relationship.12 The new adoption law takes care of possible
29
conflict with other child custody laws by transitional provisions. 1
In a strikingly radical move British Columbia has also chosen to address
intercountry adoption in its new law through reference to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.130 The province has adopted the Hague
Convention, providing for its immediate implementation as soon as the
Convention enters into force for the province, i.e., when it enters into force
for Canada.' Part III of the present work will discuss the Hague Convention and suggest ways in which implementation of the Convention can alleviate
the problem of intercountry flight from unwed fathers' rights. The suggestions
complement British Columbia's statute as they are at a level of detail not
addressed in the provincial law.
Prior to British Columbia's 1995 reforms, Saskatchewan appeared to offer
the most protection for unwed fathers. The province requires the consent of
"birth fathers" if they meet the legal definition of that term through their
behavior. 32 Additionally, Saskatchewan explicitly addresses intercountry
125. Id. § 13(5).
126. Id.§ 17(1)(a)-(d).
127. Id. § 3(1)(a)-(h).
128. Id.§ 3(l)(c), (d), (e), (h).
129. Id. §§ 94-121.
130. Id. §§ 48-57. It must be noted that Prince Edward Island, a province not covered in this
article's limited overview of Canadian law, was the first to adopt a model law implementing the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention) Act,
S.P.E.I., ch. 28 (1994) (royal assent granted, May 19, 1994). The model law resulted from the
work of the Uniform Law Conference, Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting 35, 14161 (1993).
131. Id.§ 51.
132. See An Act Respecting Adoption, S.S., ch. A-5.1, §5(1)(a)(i)(B) (1989-90). The
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adoption in its statutes, though not with respect to the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption which came into being after their enactment.' The
relevant provisions of the Adoption Act deal with applications by residents of
Saskatchewan to adopt children who are not residents of Canada. 34 The
Adoption Act requires that the adoption must conform to the laws of both
jurisdictions.' 35 The applicants must file copies "of the foreign adoption
legislation" with the Canadian court along with "an explanation disclosing how
the applicant intends to comply with foreign legislation." 3 6 The act does not
explicitly address the requirements of Canadian residence of the child for
purposes of adoption. Nevertheless, this provision in the Adoption Act is a
significant check on placement of children in Saskatchewan in contravention
of foreign consent standards.
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Ontario all define "parent" in the
context of adoption to include unwed fathers only in certain circumstances. 137 The circumstances vary, but each definition requires some evidence
of substantial connection between the father and child or between the father
and mother at a time reasonably early in a child's life. If an unwed father is
deemed a parent within the meaning of the relevant law, he must grant his
consent for an adoption to proceed.' None of these provinces has addressed
the problem of intercountry adoption in legislation, and therefore, they present

a continuing potential for intercountry flight.
In Nova Scotia, a 1990 law excludes an unwed father from the definition

of parent absent specific actions on his part. 139 One who qualifies as a parent
Saskatchewan Adoption Act defines "birth father" as the father of the child who meets one ofthe
following conditions: he lived with the birth mother at the time of the child's conception or birth;
he registered the child's birth with the birth mother; he has access or custody by court order or
agreement; he acknowledges paternity and has supported or maintained the child, the birth or the
mother; or he has been judicially declared to be the father upon application prior to the birth or
within 10 days thereafter. Id. §§ 2(1)(d)(i)(A)-(E), 3(1). The court may dispense with consent if
it is in the best interests of the child. Id. § 6(1)(a).
133. Id. § 27.
134. Id. § 27(1).
135. Id. § 27(7).
136. Id. § 27(5)(b)(i)-(ii).
137. Children and Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, § 67(1)(f) (1990); An Act
to Amend the Adoption of Children Act, 1972, NFLD. R.S., ch. A-3, § 10(1)(b), (c) (1990);
Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O., ch. 55, § 131(1) (1984).
138. S.N.S., ch. 5, § 73(3); NFLD. R.S., ch. A-3, § 10(1)(b), (c); R.S.O., ch. 55, § 131(2).
There are circumstances such as abandonment in which a court may dispense with consent even
though the province's requirements for vesting the right to withhold consent have been met.
S.N.S. ch. 5, § 75 (1990); NFLD. R.S., ch. 20, § 11(1) (1990); R.S.O., ch. 55, § 132 (1984).
139. Children and Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, § 67(1)(f) (1990).
Specifically, an unwed father is a parent only if he has legitimated the child; he has custody of
the child; he has stood in loco parentisto the child for the twelve months before the adoption
proceeding commenced; he has, by written agreement or court order, a duty to support the child
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is entitled to notice from an adoption agency," 4 and a parent's consent is
required before an adoption can be finalized."41 In some degree derogating
a biological father's rights, the best interest of the child may give a court
statutory grounds to allow an adoption even if the father has taken the requisite
steps to establish his status as a parent.142 The best interest of the child,
however, may not be argued in an opposite fashion: as a substitute
for the
43
statutory requirements that vest a right to withhold consent.'
An adoption in Newfoundland may likewise proceed without a biological
father's consent unless the father takes certain steps to vest himself with
rights. Yet again, the right to withhold consent is not absolute even if an
unwed father has taken the actions necessary to become considered a legal
parent. Newfoundland courts may dispense with the father's consent where his
conduct and the child's welfare merit it.' 45

or a right of access to the child, and he has at any time during the two years before the adoption
proceeding commenced provided support or exercised the right of access; orhe has acknowledged
paternity and either (1) has an application for custody, support or access pending before a court
at the time the adoption proceedings commence, or (2) has supported the child or exercised access
to the child within the two years before commencement of the adoption proceeding. Id.
140. Children and Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, § 68(8) (1990).
141. Children and Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, § 74(3) (1990).
142. See Children and Family Services Act of 1990, S.N.S., ch. 5, § 75 (1990). Under this
provision a court may dispense with consent upon application, but only if the person whose
consent would otherwise be required is dead, unable to consent, cannot be found, has had no
contact with the child for the two years immediately preceding the adoption placement, or has
failed to provide financial support for the child for the two years immediately preceding
placement for adoption or if circumstances show that consent ought to be dispensed with, and it
is in the best interests of the person to be adopted to dispense with consent.
143. A 1992 appellate decision mandated use of the adoption code, overturning a lower
court's resort toparenspatriaejurisdiction to hear an unwed father's application for custody. An
adoption was pending, and the father had not met the code requirements that would have vested
him with the power of consent. T. (D.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y & Family Servs., 92 D.L.R.4th
289 (NSSC, App. Div. 1992).
144. According to the Adoption of Children Act, 1972, NFLD. R.S., ch. A-3, § 10(1)(b),(c)
(1990), a biological father's consent is required only if a court has declared his paternity or
granted him an order of custody or access, if he has filed an application for a declaration of
parentage or order of custody or access with a court, or if his name is listed on the record of
birth. Id.
145. Adoption of Children Act, 1972, Nfld.R.S., ch. 20, § 11(1) (1990). A court may
dispense with a consent otherwise required by section 10(1) if it would be in the best interest of
the child to do so, having regard for the circumstances of the case. Section 11(1)(b) specifically
cites the situation where the person whose consent would be required is not a concerned parent.
Section 11(2) defines "concerned parent" as (a) one who has actual care or legal custody of the
child, (b) one who regularly exercises or attempts to exercise rights of custody or access, or (c)
one who regularly provides financial support for the child.
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Ontario's Child and Family Services Act146 defines parent in a similarly
restrictive but somewhat more elaborate fashion. Unlike Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland, the Ontario definition includes an individual who has vested
himself with a presumption of paternity under the Children's Law Reform
Act,14 unless it is proved that he is probably not the natural father. 48 Of
course, a qualifying parent must consent to the adoption of his child.149 As
one court noted in construing the interrelationship of the relevant provisions,
"the only natural father who is not by definition a 'parent' whose consent is
required by [section] 131(1) of the Act, is a male person who by an act of
casual sexual intercourse impregnates a woman and demonstrates no sense of
responsibility for the natural consequences of the act of sexual intercourse."' ° The Ontario courts may dispense with any required parental
consent if it is in the best interest of the child to do so and if the parent whose
consent is required has received both notice of the adoption and a copy of the
application to dispense with consent or if reasonable effort has been made to
give such notice.151

146. Child and Family Services Act, S.O., ch. 55, § 131 (1984).
147. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. 68, § 8(1) (1980). The rebuttable
presumptions of paternity stem from the following situations: (1) marriage to the mother at the
time of birth, (2) marriage to the mother terminated within 300 days prior to the birth, (3)
marriage to the mother after the birth along with acknowledgment of paternity, (4) cohabitation
with the mother in a permanent relationship at the time of birth or in a relationship that
terminated within 300 days prior to the birth, (5) registration of the birth under the surname of
the father in accordance with the Vital Statistics Act, or (6) judicial declaration of paternity.
Paragraph (5) of subsection 8(1) as reflected by item (5) above resulted from a 1986 amendment.
An Act to amend the Children's Law Reform Act, S.O., ch. 8, § 1 (1986).
148. Child and Family Services Act, S.O., ch. 55, § 131 (1984). The statutory definition
also includes the biological mother; an individual having lawful custody; an individual who has,
in the twelve months before the child is placedfor adoption, (1) demonstrated a settled intention
to treat a child as a child of his or her family or (2) acknowledged parentage and provided for
the child's support; an individual required by court order to provide for the child or allowed by
court order custody of or access to the child; and an individual who has acknowledged parentage
of the child in writing under the Children's Law Reform Act. Id. (emphasis added) (referencing
An act to amend the Children's Law Reform Act, S.O., ch. 8, § 2 (1986)).
149. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O., ch. 55, § 131(2) (1984) (dictating that consent
is only necessary for adoptions of children under the age of sixteen).
150. S.(C.E.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 64 O.R.2d 311, 316 (OHC 1988).
151. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O., ch. 55, § 132 (1984). See, e.g., Re R., 53
O.R.2d 54 (Ont. Dist. Ct. 1985) (dispensing with consent under Child Welfare Act where father
had only a casual relationship with mother, was unaware of pregnancy or birth, had taken no part
in the care of the child, and court was convinced his consent was not required within the
definition of parent extant at that time). But see Re C.(H.L.), 23 A.C.W.S.3d 175 (Ont. Prov.
Div. 1990) (holding that it would be contrary to child's best interests to dispense with consent
where father maintained occasional contact with mother after birth of child, even though child
had been placed with prospective adoptive parents for over two years).
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In recent years Alberta had become a haven for U.S. birth mothers
seeking to avoid paternal custody by placing their children through private
adoptions.' 52 Private adoptions arranged by unlicensed intermediaries were
legal in Alberta for a period of about ten years' before a 1995 law,
specifically aimed at the problem of cross-border adoptions, prohibited
them. 54 Only the province and licensed agencies may now process adoptions. 55 One of the reasons that Alberta became an intercountry adoption
magnet was its extremely. limited paternal consent provision.' 56 Under the
Child Welfare Act only the consents of the child's guardians are required. 5
The guardianship of a child is determined under the Domestic Relations Act
of 1980. That act confers sole guardianship to the mother where a child is
born outside marriage and accords an unwed biological father no legal status
concerning his child unless he has lived with the child's mother for at least one
year immediately preceding the child's birth.' 58
Where a father does not meet this test it is still possible for his interests
to be considered by the court in an adoption proceeding. The Child Welfare
Amendments Act of 1988, which rewrote Part 6 concerning adoption, provided
for notice to a biological father if there were no permanent guardianship
agreement or order. 5 9 However, only the parties petitioning for adoption
152. Kim Lunman, Unlicensed Trade in Babies Leaves a Path of Pain, VANCOUVER SUN,
Mar. 12, 1994, atA2. One U.S. attorney admitted to placing forty infants in Alberta in situations
when the unwed father opposed the unwed mother's decision to place the child for adoption,
taking advantage of that province's lesser protections for unwed fathers. Id.
153. Id. Under the Child Welfare Act, prior to amendment, any adult could apply to the
prescribed court for an adoption order as long as either the child or the applicant was a resident
in Alberta or the court waived the residency requirement. R.S.A., ch. C-8.1, § 56 (1984).
154. Under the 1995 amendments unlicensed intermediaries are prohibited under penalty of
fine or imprisonment from arranging adoptions, and petitions for adoption are only permissible
where the child is a Canadian citizen or lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence.
Kim Lunman, Adoption Reform Bill Will PutBaby Brokers Out of Business, CALGARY HERALD,
Mar. 31, 1995, at AS.
155. Id.
156. Lunman, supra note 4, at A8. In addition, the 1988 Adoption Act did not deal
specifically with intercountry adoption other than to proclaim that an adoption effected according
to the law of any other jurisdiction would be accorded the same effect in Alberta as an adoption
under Alberta law. Child Welfare Amendments Act, R.S.A., ch. 15, § 61 (1988).
157. R.S.A., ch. 15, §§ 56(1). The court may dispense with the consent of a guardian if it
is necessary or desirable to do so. Id. § 63(4).
158. Domestic Relations Act, R.S.A., ch. D-37, § 47(l)(b)(iii) (1980) (re-enacted by Family
and Domestic Relations Statutes Amendment Act, S.A., ch. 11, §1(2) (1991)). Aperson declared
to be a parent may be appointed as a joint guardian if the court finds that "it is in the best interest
of the child and the [parent] is able and willing to assume the responsibility of a guardian."
R.S.A., ch. D-37, § 47(2), S.A., ch. 11, §1(2).
159. Child Welfare Amendments Act, 1988, S.A., ch. 15, §§ 60(1)(d) (1988). The court
may, however, dispense with any required notice except notice to the director of child and family

services. Id. § 60(3)(c).
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(and the child if at least twelve years of age) are entitled to be heard at the
hearing before the court.16
The right to notice and an opportunity to have one's interests considered
did not afford much protection or comfort, however, for the five biological
fathers from the U.S. who opposed the adoption of their children in Alberta
courts and lost in all five cases, including "Baby Boy M." 161 In the Baby
Boy M case, the infant left the U.S. with the prospective adoptive parents who
returned to their home in Alberta where they obtained a court order of
guardianship and custody." u Four and one half months later the biological
father petitioned the Alberta court for guardianship and custody and for return
of his child under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction." Two and one half months later the prospective adoptive
parents petitioned for an order of adoption. 6 4 At trial the father's counsel
appeared to abandon his claim for return of the child under the International
Convention, arguing solely for guardianship and custody." The trial court
refused the father's petition and granted the order of adoption. 60 The trial
court found that the father's consent was required, but that the court could
dispense with it which it did. 67 On appeal this decision was affirmed,
although the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's determination that
the father's consent was required. 6 ' The appellate court found ample
evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that adoption was in the best
interests of the child. 69

160. Id. §§ 63(2). Prior to this amendment there was no provision for notice to the father
under either the Child Welfare Act, 1980, or the Child Welfare Act, 1984, which repealed the
earlier law. Child Welfare Act, S.A., ch. C-8.1, § 58(1) (1984) (notice). Nevertheless, under
provisions of the 1980 Act notice was likely to be given where the father remained a "real
presence" in the child's life as where he supported the child and exercised rights of access. See
Re L. and A., 26 D.L.R. 4th 615, 618-19 (Ct. App. 1986). The court based its decision on the
requirement that an adoption be predicated on the welfare and interests of the child. It reasoned
that the welfare of a child must include weighing the father's continuing presence and his
willingness and ability to support the child. As the current law requires that adoption be in the
best interests of the child, S.A., ch. 15, § 64(1)(b) (1988), the precedential value of this case may
continue unimpaired.
161. Lunman, supra note 152, at A2.
162. D. (H.A.) v. M. (N.C.), 145 A.R. 200 (C.A. 1993) (per curiam), aff'g sub nom. S.
(J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L.R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993), appeal refused, Doe. 23915 (Can. Mar.
3, 1994), 1 R.F.L. 4th 60.
163. Id.; see infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (regarding the Convention).
164. D. (H.A.), 145 A.R. at 202.
165. Id. The appellate court's decision with respect to the claim for return under the
Convention will be discussed infra in Part II-C.
166. S. (J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L.R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993).
167. Id.
168. D. (H.A.), 145 A.R. at 206.

169. Id.
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C. Toward a Solution
Many Canadian provinces and U.S. states allow for consideration in an
adoption proceeding of a biological father's interest in obtaining custody and
maintaining a relationship with his child. It is generally true that the power of
consent is conferred sparingly on unwed fathers. It is also true, however, that
recent law in the United States and Canada has begun to broaden the ability
of unwed fathers to obtain legal recognition of their rights to raise their
children by granting easier access to the zone of consent. Timely offers of
support, interest, paternal acknowledgment, and applications for custody may
suffice in certain states and provinces without the sometimes impossible
obstacles of cohabitation or maternal acknowledgment of paternity that still
exist in some Canadian jurisdictions, such as Alberta. The essential problem
lies in the different legal approaches taken by individual provinces and states.
A descriptive survey of the minutiae of consent laws in all fifty U.S. states and
a subsequent comparison with those of the Canadian provinces is not necessary
to set out the basic comparative law problem. To the extent that access to the
zone of consent is wider or more easily reached by unwed fathers in one U.S.
state than in a Canadian province, there exists the incentive for a birth mother
to pursue intercountry adoption.
Placing a child in a Canadian province with narrower access to the zone
of consent may be more attractive than U.S. alternatives such as paternal
custody or the potentially complicated process of obtaining paternal consent
that may protract and ultimately prevent an adoption. As noted above, only
some provincial' laws address this problem. The lack of an immediately
available, uniform solution to the problem calls for further attention from the
legal community.
In searching for an appropriate solution to the problem of intercountry
flight, one might attempt a traditional conflict of laws analysis. However, a
better solution lies in the establishment of a binding set of positive rules to
govern both originating and receiving states specifically. In a fairly recent turn
in international law, the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption provides
such rules. Implementation of the Convention as discussed below would
remove the impetus for intercountry flight. Such a preventive approach is a far
broader solution than the mere return of a child in an individual case.
In contrast, other conventions do not adequately address the problem,
even on a case-by-case basis. A parent with custodial rights may seek the
return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction. 70 This Convention addresses the problem of
the wrongful removal of a child from his or her habitual place of residence in

170. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 1501.
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breach of custody rights that were actually exercised under the laws of the
place of habitual residence or would have been exercised but for the
removal."' In the case of newborns removed immediately after birth by
unmarried mothers, it is not clear that the biological father has custody rights
or that the newborn is habitually resident in a contracting state within the
meaning of the Convention. 72
In fact, in the Baby Boy M case, the father made an argument under the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction in his initial pleadings that he revived
on appeal." The appellate court rejected his argument because it was of the
opinion that there had been no wrongful removal of a child habitually resident
in the U.S. in breach of existing rights of custody. 74 The prospective
adoptive parents took the child to Canada within days of his birth, and at that
point the father merely had the right to apply for custody.'75
In addition to offering a remedy for individual cases such as Baby Boy M,
ratification of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption would also
create a need for specific legal mechanisms for implementation. These
mechanisms could be tailored to particular problems such as circumvention of
paternal consent and prevention of prolonged legal battles over parentage of
children. The next section of this article develops a set of such mechanisms
and poses them as a blueprint for national law reform.
Im. THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

In May 1993, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
unanimously approved the text of a convention on intercountry adoption
formally titled Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, but universally known as the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption. 76 For more than one hundred years,
the Hague Conference has been a forum for negotiation of questions of private
international law among its membership, a small group of developed countries.
Preparation and negotiation of the Convention on Intercountry Adoption took
place between 1988 and 1993.'1 The process was unusual for the Hague

171. Id. at arts. 3, 4.
172. See supra note 132.
173. D. (H.A.) v. M. (N.C.), 145 A.R. 200 (C.A. 1993) (per curiam), aff'g sub nom. S.
(J.W.) v. M. (N.C.), 10 Alta. L.R. 3d 395 (Q.B. 1993), appeal refused, Doe. 23915 (Can. Mar.
3, 1994), 1 R.F.L. 4th 60.
174. Id. The court also found that it was not incumbent on the court to raise the issue without
an actual application to the court for return of the child under the Convention.
175. Id.
176. Hague Convention, supra note 7.
177. For information on the process and participants summarized in this paragraph see Pfund,
supra note 1, at 53-55.
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Conference because participants included a large number of non-member
developing nations and a significant number of non-governmental organizations. The subject matter of the negotiations shaped the contours of the
process. Developing countries are usually the original homes of children
adopted by residents of developed nations. In some countries, such as the
United States, non-governmental organizations are the primary actors in both
domestic and intercountry adoptions. The tensions and conflicting interests
among these three main groups of participants dictated the eventual substantive
form of the Convention.
As it stands, the Convention approves the concept of intercountry adoption
but seeks to set up a system of minimum standards to govern the process. The
purposes of the Convention are: (1) to ensure that intercountry adoptions take
place in a manner which serves the best interest of the child and with respect
for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law; (2) to
establish a means to enforce safeguards designed to prevent the abduction,
sale, or trafficking of children; and (3) to set up a means for legal recognition
of adoptions made in accordance with the Convention's terms. The drafters of
the Convention set the minimum standards by imposing substantive and
procedural requirements on both countries of origin and receiving states where
adopted children will be raised. Authorities designated by countries to carry
out Convention functions must be accredited under the terms of the Convention. Once accredited, these authorities carry out particular functions in the
state of origin and the receiving state to give effect to the adoption. Finally,
if a competent authority of the state of the adoption certifies that an adoption
has been made in accordance with the Convention, that adoption is to be
recognized by operation of law in all other contracting states (unless a state
refuses on the grounds that an adoption is manifestly contrary to its public
policy).
The Convention entered into force on May 1, 1995.17 Canada signed
the Convention on April 12, 1994,179 but has not yet ratified it. The United
States signed the Convention on March 31, 1994, but it has not ratified it.
Therefore, the Convention is not in force with respect to either country. The
following discussion will address ways in which ratification and implementation by the United States may prevent international flight undertaken to avoid
U.S. adoption law. Even if the U.S. fails to ratify the Convention, the
mechanisms for its implementation suggested below may serve as models for
the reform of domestic law.

178. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at 1144 (referencing arts. 43, 46). Under Article 46,
the Convention enters into force three months after the third instrument of ratification has been
deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the designated
depositary under Article 43.
179. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, July 4, 1994.
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A. How the Convention May PreventInternationalFlight
As discussed earlier, the fact that the states of the United States and the
provinces of Canada have different standards respecting an unwed biological
father's consent has enabled cross border adoptions that take advantage of
these differences."
Rather than dictating that contracting countries have
identical laws on adoption, the Hague Convention seeks to regulate adoptions
while recognizing that there are many different attitudes and legal standards
regarding adoption. Therefore, the Convention does not dictate when an unwed
father's consent is required for an adoption to take place. Instead, it imposes
on the designated authorities of the state of origin certain obligations without
the fulfillment of which an adoption may not take place. These obligations
include:
(a) to establish that the child is adoptable;
(b) to determine that an intercountry adoption is in the child's best
interest;
(c) to ensure that all consents necessary under the law of the state of
origin have been given freely in the required form, in writing, after
notification of the effect of the legal consent, and in the case of the mother,
only after birth of the child, without the inducement of payment and that
the consents have not been withdrawn; and
(d) to ensure that children of an appropriate age and maturity have
been counselled and informed of the effect of the adoption; that consideration has been given to the child's wishes and opinions; and that if his or
her consent is required, that it has been freely given in the required legal
form, in writing, after notification of the effects of the consent, and
without the inducement of payment."'
The procedural requirements for carrying out these obligations fall on the
designated authority of the state of origin. Basic requirements include the
preparation of a written report on the child to be adopted, including his or her
adoptability. The authority must also gather the written consents outlined
above. Based on reports on the child and reports on the prospective adoptive
parents prepared and transmitted by the designated authorities in the receiving
state, the authority in the state of origin must next determine that the adoption
is in the best interest of the child. Finally, the authority transmits a report to

180. There are other problems stemming from a lack of uniformity in adoption law among
states in the United States, among provinces in Canada, and between the United States and
Canada. One problem is how to implement the Hague Convention in different kinds of federal
systems. See Vaughan Black, GAYTfor Kids: New Rulesfor IntercountryAdoption of Children,
11 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 253, 304-08 (1994) (offering Canadian perspective on the Convention).
181. See Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 4.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:497

the receiving state that includes, inter alia, proof that the necessary consents
have been obtained and the reasons for its determination on the placement.
Thus, if the United States and Canada were to ratify and implement the
Convention, there would imminently be a means to avoid circumvention of
paternal consent requirements. Both countries would have to develop or
accredit bureaucracies to carry out the regulatory requirements, including the
duty of the country of origin to verify domestic consents.
As both governments are federal systems, they might choose to create
local authorities, such as one for each state or province (though they also
would have a federal level authority through which intercountry transmissions
of communication would be channeled). In any case, accredited authorities
must be competent to conduct Convention tasks and must be directed and
staffed by persons qualified through training or experience to work in the field
of intercountry adoption. The Convention does not, however, dictate how
accredited authorities in each country are to perform Convention requirements.
This silence creates a bureaucratic vacuum.
In the context of the consent problem, accredited agencies will have to
develop a means to verify that the consents required by law have been duly
obtained in accordance with the Convention. This is essentially a two step
process. First, the accredited authority will have to develop a process to
determine whose consent is required. Next, once the persons have been
identified, there must be a process to verify that the required consents meet
Convention standards. Finally, there must also be a contingent third stage for
cases in which an unwed father's assertion of paternity and the right to
withhold consent are contested.'1
Prior to any further discussion of such mechanisms, it must be noted that
the Hague Convention may not afford universal protection against international
flight posed by legal consent requirements. Under the Convention, prospective
adoptive parents who are habitually resident in one contracting state, who wish
to adopt a child who is habitually resident in another contracting state, must
apply through the designated authority in their home state. This jurisdictional
language creates a significant loophole. If a mother gives birth in the United
States and immediately takes her child to Canada for adoption placement, it is
unclear whether that child is a habitual resident of the United States for
purposes of coverage under Convention requirements. Mainly, this is because
the Convention does not define "habitually resident." 8 3 At least the Conven-

182. Subsection i-B will set out this author's suggestions for mechanisms to achieve the
verification of consent that the Convention requires. There is a model consent form developed
for use under the Convention. Report of the Special Commission of October 1994 on the
Implementation of the Hague Convention of May 29, 1993, Annex B (report published by the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and on file with the
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW)

183. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 170,
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tion provides a contracting country with the means to avoid the problem.
Article 28 allows countries to enact laws to prevent the transfer of a child who
is habitually resident in that country prior to adoption. By enacting such a law,
the United States could define "habitually resident " s4
" to include newborns
and thereby require that their adoptions proceed in the United States where
domestic law on consent could be effectively overseen by a judicial system
familiar with its requirements. An alternative solution allowed by the
Convention would be a bilateral agreement under Article 39.
Another loophole within the jurisdictional language of Article 2 results
when a pregnant woman crosses the border just prior to giving birth. Unless
the United States were to enact a law defining "habitually resident" to include
an infant who had never independently existed within its borders, 1"5 it is
difficult to see how the Convention would prevent the consent circumvention
problem described in section II above. International travel prior to birth would
make the subsequent adoption an internal matter of the haven country, rather
than an intercountry adoption subject to the requirements of the Convention.
A third loophole has nothing to do with the Convention's jurisdiction, but
rather with human nature. It is foreseeable that a woman wishing for the
speedy adoption of her child and wanting to avoid the obstacle of consent from
the child's biological father"8 6 may not reveal the biological father's identity,
or she may even present a "false" consent from a man other than the true
father. The latter situation occurred in the famous "Baby Jessica" case."8

at art. 4 (applying to children "habitually resident" in a contracting state, but also failing to define
the term). The U.S. State Department's legal analysis of the Convention is likewise unhelpful.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, App. C (1980). One commentator suggests that a child must have
actually lived in a state for that child to be a "habitual resident"-neither citizenship nor domicile
are relevant. See ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE, & ADOPTION

CASES § 2.32 (1993 & Supp. 1996). This is problematic in the case of newborns. Traditional
conflict of law rules confer the domicile of the parent with whom a newborn is living upon the
infant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 (1971).
184. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994),
aimed at avoiding jurisdictional competition between state courts in child custody matters, defines
a child's "home state" as the state in which the child lived with a parent or parents for at least
six consecutive months or, in the case of a child less than six months old, the state in which the
child lived from birth with a parent or parents. While this does not address the problem of infants
being removed immediately after their birth to another country for adoption, the statute provides
an available model for a federal, preemptive, and uniform approach to the problem. A statute
addressed to the problem of intercountry adoption should adopt the national domicile of the
mother as the definition of the "habitual residence" of a newborn.
185. The U.S. citizenship of the child of a U.S. mother giving birth in Canada has not been
sufficient to confer "habitual residence" on children. See supra note 183.
186. One must acknowledge that there are many possible reasons for a woman to bypass the
actual father, not the least of which is fear of violence.
187. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.),
stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993).
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Of course, a false consent only creates a problem if the biological father comes
forward. The accredited bodies under the Convention must be given proper
authority and develop for themselves effective means to detect and deter false
consents and to deal with biological fathers coming forward after the adoption
process has begun. Without such effective mechanisms, the Convention does
nothing to solve the problem of international flight toward intercountry
adoption and away from domestic consent requirements. In fact, by regulating
intercountry adoption, the Convention may make that option a more "normalized" choice for a woman who is unable or unwilling to raise her child.
Despite jurisdictional loopholes and practical problems, ratification and
implementation of the Convention still present a promising means to prevent
nullification of paternal consent through the verification requirements of the
Convention. The bureaucratic vacuum left open by the Convention presents the
legal community with an ideal opportunity to suggest ways to prevent
protracted adjudication of consent issues that harm everyone involved,
including the most vulnerable interested party, the child.
B. How to Invent Speedy Mechanisms for Adjudicating Consent Under the
Convention
Each country that implements the Hague Convention has an opportunity
to create new mechanisms to avoid problems such as lengthy intercountry legal
battles over consent. In the following subsections I suggest a plan of
implementation tailored to the United States, but perhaps equally applicable to
the Canadian federal form of government.
1. Identification andNotification of Putative Fathers
The first obstacle to obtaining consent, where the parents are not married,
is the identification of the biological father. If the mother does not supply
information adequate to effect notification and consent, the accredited bodies
under the Convention must have a means to identify a father whose consent
is required under applicable state law. To protect the privacy of the mother,
however, the basic burden should be placed on the biological father to identify
himself through the accredited authority in his state of residence. That
authority should have a computer link with every other authority in the country
so that one identification will suffice even if the mother has relocated to
another state.' 88 Further there must be a legislative restriction on the use of

188. The idea of computerized, nation-wide registries of information is not a novel concept.
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act established a national computer system for instant
checks of information on criminal backgrounds ofpotential gun purchasers to be made operational
for use by gun sellers within five years. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (1994). Similarly, the federal
government collects information on physicians subject to state disciplinary action for inclusion
in a national database entitled the National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on
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the information to protect the privacy of the men who identify themselves as
putative fathers.
The establishment of a national computer registry with fifty nodes
consisting of the accredited convention authorities of each state would improve
upon the patchwork of existing state registries 89 and bypass some very real
problems. Mothers, fathers, and children do not always reside in the same
place, even where no "flight" exists. Even the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act
does not adequately address these practical location problems (in the context
of domestic adoption). In its section on notification of unknown fathers, the
Uniform Act places the burden on the court hearing a petition for termination
of parental rights prior to adoption to identify and notify the father, if
possible.'" The court must make certain inquiries to accomplish this
purpose. The comment to this section makes clear that the birth mother may
refuse to give the court information. 9' Faced with such a dilemma the court
should examine "any putative father registry in a State where the alleged father
might have been during the mother's pregnancy or at the time of the minor's
birth." 92 There does not seem to be a direction to search all registries.
Thus, if the court fails to find the father, it proceeds to give notice by
publication or posting, unless neither method is likely to lead to notice." 9
The requirements I suggest build on the current, separate putative father
registry system but make access to information much easier, swifter, and more
likely to lead to identification and notification of fathers. Placing an affirmative, uniform burden of registration on men to preserve their rights for the
purpose of intercountry adoption encourages action, but only where the
registration system is indeed uniform and national in scope. A linked registry
system would also provide more in the way of "due process" than the
Constitution currently requires.' 94 This improvement, in turn, would better

Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners. 54 Fed. Reg. 42,722 (Dep't HHS 1989). In the
adoption context, many states maintain separate putative father registries. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM.
REL. § 111-a(2)(h) (McKinney 1988); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1991
& Supp. 1997). The latest Uniform Adoption Act contemplates sharing information among
registries containing information about an adoptee's biological parents and genetic history by
mandating that statewide registries for the filing and release of such information "cooperate with
registries in other States to facilitate the matching of documents filed pursuant to this [article] by
individuals in different States. .. ." UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 6-106(4) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 84
(Supp. 1996). See infra note 335 (stating Uniform Act's position regarding the release of such
information). While such national databases pose threats to privacy, the law has already
recognized their social usefulness when coupled with appropriate protections.
189. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 4138-c (McKinney Supp. 1996).
190. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-404 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 48 (Supp. 1996).
191. Id. § 3-404 cmt. at 49.
192. Id.
193. UNiF. ADOPTION AT § 3-404 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 1996).
194. InLehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
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protect both the interest of fathers in their paternity and the interests of all
others in a speedy process.
The establishment of a linked national registry requires further elaboration
on its use. There must be strict time limits on the ability of a father to identify
himself as someone whose consent is required. Putative fathers must file with
the convention authorities just as they must now file with putative father
registries in some states. " Failure to know that such a registry or intercountry adoption identification procedure exists would not excuse a putative father
from timely identification requirements. Further, placing the burden on the
father to know of the registry does not deny him due process. 196 An appropriate time limit would be no later than one month after birth of the child or
one month after notification of the pregnancy, whichever occurs earlier. 197
Starting the clock at this point ensures a balance among the interest of a father
in assuming parental responsibilities; the interest of a child in having a stable
family at the earliest possible time; and the interests of the state, the biological
mother, and the prospective adoptive parents in obtaining speedy, final
adoptions.
Once a putative father timely registers his identity, he would be entitled to
receive notice of a pending intercountry adoption and to take the next,
essential step: filing a notice with the accredited authority that he intends to
withhold his consent to the adoption. This latter filing would start the process
of adjudicating paternity and consent that is discussed in subsection III-B-2,
below.
The bottom line is that the putative father must protect his own interests.
He must register his identity with the convention authority to preserve his right
to receive notice of a pending adoption and his right to contest the adoption
single state's paternal notification system (including an in-state registry) as a sufficient protection
of a biological father's interest in developing a relationship with his child.
195. State filings are generally required to insure that fathers receive notice of pending
adoptions. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a (McKinney 1988) (stating registration
entitles father to notice of pending adoption and that other classes of persons are also entitled to

notice).
196. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264 (stating failure of father to register prior to adoption due to
ignorance of registry was insufficient ground to challenge constitutionality of notice law).
197. There have been various suggestions in the literature as to what is timely assumption
of parental responsibility. For example, in redefining parenthood in terms of responsibility in all
contexts, Karen Czapanskiy posits a reasonable period of six months from birth as one in which
both parents may have time to formulate, test, and resolve their commitment to parenthood or
their choice to place a child for adoption; immediate and unwavering action is not consistent with
mature assumption of a decision with life-long consequences. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and
Draftees: The Struggle ForParentalEquality,38 UCLA L. REv. 1415, 1479-80 (1991). I agree
in principle that time for reflection and doubt honors both the nature of humanity and the gravity
of the decision, but six months is too longfrom theperspectiveofthe child. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 27, at 46 (stating adoption should ideally be final upon placement and time
for appeals should be limited with decisions rendered within days).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/3
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by withholding consent. It must be stressed that neither knowledge of
pregnancy or birth, nor knowledge of a pending intercountry adoption, starts
the clock. Timely identification of putative paternity cannot depend on these
individual factors that are variable and unpredictable. The event of birth and
pendency of adoption themselves must govern. Any other rule would run
contrary to the interests of speedy, final adoption.
Once a putative father identifies himself and has his name posted on the
national registry, the authority in the state of the putative father's residence
should become responsible for notifying the father when an intercountry
adoption process has started (with respect to the child he claims as his
offspring). Official notice should be made by certified mail, return receipt
requested. If the deadline for filing notice of intent to withhold consent is
within one week of expiring, the convention authority should be obligated to
inform the putative father by express mail service.
Where a convention authority has timely knowledge of the identity and
whereabouts of a putative father through means other than the national filing
procedure, the convention authority should be obliged to notify that man in the
same manner as in other cases. This again accords more process than the
Constitution currently requires,' 9 8 but it is in accord with fundamental
concepts of fairness.
When a biological father fails to identify himself to any convention
authority and his identity is not otherwise known to the convention authority
handling an intercountry adoption of his child, there should be no duty on the
part of any convention authority to notify that father of the pending adoption.
If the putative father learns of the process after the time limit for identification
has run, he may still attempt to withhold his consent to the intercountry
adoption, but the procedures and limits outlined in the next subsection will
apply.
2. ProposedProceduresfor Adjudicating Paternity and Consent
If a biological father comes forward or is identified and notified in a
timely manner, an intercountry adoption bureaucracy must be ready with a
means to adjudicate disputes concerning paternity and consent. As illustrated
by painful litigation in the United States, the absence of a mechanism for
speedy adjudication can cause much harm to the child. It is interesting that
parental rights in the United States are a derivation of the concept of
property, 199 yet our litigation system affords less protection than if the object
198. InLehr, 463 U.S. at 265, the Court found that the Due Process Clause was not offended
by a family court's failure to notify a putative father known to the court who did not fall within
the classes of putative fathers entitled to notice under state law.
199. See WOMEN INAMERICAN LAW: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE NEw DEAL 64, 86-88
(Marlene Stein Wortman ed., 1st vol. 1985) (discussing the treatment of children as parental
property).
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of the contest was actually property. Specifically, there are lesser protections
for the maintenance and value of the "property" and the putative "owner's"
interest in it during the litigation when the fight is over human rather than nonhuman chattel. If parties were fighting over non-human assets with the

potential for phenomenal growth, the system would afford parties the ability
to petition the court for temporary and immediate relief pendente lite by way
of a preliminary injunction. Commentators agree that expedited proceedings
should be incorporated into the system of adoption consent and custody
battles.' But few do more than simply call for expedition. 20' What is
needed is an actual blueprint for a system of speedy adjudication of consent
issues. The need exists in both domestic law and under the Hague Convention.
The development of a blueprint for the system to be used under the Hague
Convention could readily be incorporated into existing Convention practice by
recommendation of the Special Commission.m
The accredited authorities under the Hague Convention should adopt a
uniform two-stage process to determine in a matter of weeks whether the
putative father's consent is required. This determination would in turn fulfill
the authorities' obligations under the Convention to verify that all necessary
consents have been obtained and to decide whether the child is adoptable. 203
To start the process, a putative father would have to file a notice of intent
to withhold consent. To prevent delay and the accompanying high human
costs, the deadline for filing the notice of intent should be no later than one

200. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuationof Patriarchy,95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 96 (1995).
201. Even the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws does not
recognize the need for expedition at allpoints of the adoption process. For example, there are
no time limits on the investigation for, identification of, and notice to unknown fathers in
§ 3-404, and similarly, there are no time limits on determinations regarding interim placement
of a minor in a contested adoption under § 3-204. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr §§ 3-204, 3-404 (1994),
9 U.L.A. 41, 48 (Supp. 1996). To its credit, the Uniform Adoption Act calls for explicit
expedition in its time limits on petitioning for adoption and for the court to hear the petition (3-6
months after filing), as well as in its express six month limit on any proceeding to contest an
adoption decree. Id. §§ 3-302, 3-701, 3-707 at 43, 58, 62.
202. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at 1144. The Special Commission convenes regularly
regarding practical operation of the Convention. In its first meeting in 1994, the Special
Commission developed a uniform consent form to be used in the verification of parental consent
under Convention procedures, see supra note 182, as the Conference had requested at its
seventeenth session when it first adopted the Convention, Hague Convention, supra note 7 at
1146.
203. This suggested procedural framework parallels the multi-stage proceeding envisioned
under the Uniform Adoption Act in which there is interim placement, termination of parental
rights, and a subsequent determination on the adoption petition. UNIF. ADOPTION ACr §§ 3-204,
3-501 to 506, 3-701, 3-703 to 705 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 41, 50-56, 58-62 (Supp. 1996). The
variations stem from the different role of Hague Convention accredited authorities from domestic
judicial bodies in adoptions.
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month after birth or one month after the putative father receives notice of the
mother's intent to place the child for adoption, whichever is earlier. In a
fashion similar to that used to register his identification, the putative father
should be able to file his notice with the accredited convention authority in the
state of his residence regardless of the child's location. If the child is already
in another state, the authority receiving the notice should forward it to the
authority in the state where the child resides.
The authority in the state where the child resides should then have the
obligation of serving the notice on the biological mother, the prospective
adoptive parents, if any, and any adoption agency that has been involved. That
authority also would have jurisdiction to make the eventual determination that
the child is adoptable and that all necessary consents have been obtained in a
manner consistent with the Convention. After completing service, the
accredited convention authority should set up a schedule for completion of the
decisional process. The expedited decisional process would take place in two
stages. First, a preliminary hearing should take place, and the adjudicator
should render a decision regarding temporary placement within one month of
the father's filing of notice. Second, a final hearing should be held, and the
adjudicator should give a determination regarding consent and adoptability
within one month of the preliminary result.
Such a decisional scheme should avoid the delays, formality, and
unnecessary complexity inherent in the typical custody litigation model. That
is, the Convention process should not be a trial in miniature. What is more,
compressing the process maintains the necessary balance among the interest
of the father in assuming parental responsibilities, the interest of the child in
having a stable family at the earliest possible time in development, and the
interests of the state, the biological mother, and the prospective adoptive
parents in speedy, final adoptions.'

204. As noted earlier, supra note 201, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws recognizes the need for expedition in the adoption process. With respect to
the situation of "thwarted fathers," i.e., those who are prevented through no fault of their own
from assuming parental responsibilities, the Conference recognizes the need to balance the
father's rights against the interest of the child. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt. (1994), 9
U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 1996). This recognition gives rise to more efficient notification procedures,
but not to extensions of the necessarily tight time frames. A "thwarted father" may block an
adoption by making proper showings in the termination proceeding, but the court must proceed
with the hearing "expeditiously." Further, the court must terminate rights within 20 days after
service of notice when an alleged father does not file a claim of paternity within that time. Id.
at § 2-401 cmt., § 3-504(a) (c) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 28, 52-53 (Supp. 1996). No challenge to an
adoption decree is allowed after six months, even one made by a "thwarted father." Id. at § 2401 cmt., § 3-707 cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 27, 62-63 (Supp. 1996). Adherence to this six month
limit "minimizes the risks of serious harm to minor children and their adoptive families which
arise if the finality of adoptions and termination orders is not secure." Id. at § 3-707 cmt. (1994),
9 U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 1996).
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The constitutionality of this two-stage, "streamlined" process' rests on
decisions as to unwed fathers' rights discussed in subsection II-B, above. "The
establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends
is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. "I Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized a child's
interest in prompt and certain adoption procedures.' The Court has also
declared that if a biological father has not grasped his opportunity to develop
an actual relationship with his child, a state need not listen to his opinion in
an adoption proceeding.' 8 Yet, there is no clear enunciation of the process
due a putative father who does have a right to be heard. I argue that the need
for promptness in the context of adoption demands that something less than
full-blown litigation as we now know it is warranted. 9

205. With respect to expeditious filing and completion of the adoption see id. at § 3-701 &
cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 59 (Supp. 1996). The Conference comment pointedly notes that prompt
filing of adoption petitions and a six month deadline on final hearings is a dramatic change from
current practice in most states. A move toward uniform, expeditious adoption laws is a goal of
the utmost national importance. It should be of no less importance when the adoption is
intercountry rather than domestic.
206. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (finding failure to provide any hearing on
unwed father's parental fitness unconstitutional).
207. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). If a father such as Jonathan Lehr, who has
taken action to notify the adoption forum that he is seeking to establish legal paternity, has no
right to be heard at all, then it is constitutionally conceivable that a putative father's right to be
heard may be appropriately curtailed to protect the child's interest and the state's interest in
prompt and certain adoption.
208. Id. Lehr was a case in which the biological father contested the failure of the state to
-notify him and allow him to be heard concerning the adoption of his child. It was not a case
regarding whether his consent to the adoption was required. The Court decided that he had failed
to grasp the adequate opportunity afforded by the state to file with a putative father registry. The
Court ultimately upheld the adoption in which he had no opportunity to be heard. See id.
209. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), a non-adoption case involving termination
of parental rights based on allegations of neglect, the Court held that the state must prove its case
by clear and convincing evidence. In addressing what process is due a biological parent prior to
termination, the Court weighed the state's interest in the welfare of the child and in reducing
administrative costs and burdens against the parents' and child's interest in avoiding erroneous
termination. According to the Court, the overriding goal was the accurate determination of the
necessity of breaking the parent-child relationship without substantial fiscal burdens. See id. It
is not clear whether Santosky's economic priorities are applicable to the adoption scenario. Not
all states require a separate termination proceeding to precede an adoption. New York does not
require the consent of certain persons (as discussed in section I-B-1), and no process is due such
persons to determine whether their consent is required. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983). On the other hand, family preservation was of great importance to the Santosky court,
and if one does apply Santosky's priorities in the adoption setting, it becomes unavoidable to
realize how a more streamlined process would support, rather than undermine, the preservation
of these "natural familial bonds." After all, the existing judicial processes led to "Baby Jessica"
situations which are less conducive to early establishment of such bonds.
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In the streamlined Convention process that I propose, there also should
be a limitation on which parties may participate. Allowed opponents of an
adoption would include the putative father and the biological mother where
their interests are aligned,21 and allowed proponents would include the
biological mother and the prospective adoptive parents where their interests are
aligned. Of course, the child whose adoptability is at issue would have
standing. The convention authority should have a staff member whose
responsibilities include representing the interest of the child in all such
adjudications. Such representation would diminish the possibility of delay
caused by appointment of a guardian ad litem on an individual basis. The
authority should similarly assign one person or group to handle all paternal
consent cases. This structure would encourage efficiency stemming from
expertise as well as consistency in decision-making.
The adjudication process I envision would be an informal meeting in
which a decision-maker would hear from and question all parties and their
representatives in a manner dictated by the decision-maker. It would not
include trial-type testimony and cross-examination of witnesses. All evidence
as to facts would enter the record by way of sworn affidavit, and there would
be no right to present witnesses. The decision-maker would resolve conflicts
as to relevant facts on the basis of the internal consistency and persuasiveness
of the affidavits, the relationship of the affiant to either party, questions asked
of counsel during oral argument, and questions directed to the parties
themselves during the hearing.
At the outset of the process, the decision-maker would hold a pre-hearing
conference to determine if paternity is an issue. If so, the decision-maker
should instruct the parties as to what physical evidence would be necessary to
decide that issue. If paternity is not contested and only the biological father's
ability to withhold his legal consent is contested, the decision-maker would set
up a schedule for receipt of written briefs and a date for the hearing. The
issues to be briefed and argued will vary depending on the stage of the
proceeding. As discussed in section HI-B-3 below, the criteria for temporary
placement would dictate the structure of the first stage of the proceeding. Once
a temporary placement has been made, the decision-maker would instruct the
parties as to the schedule for written briefs and oral argument for the second
stage of the proceeding in which the questions of the father's legal ability to
withhold consent and the child's adoptability will be the sole, interrelated
issues for determination. Finally, the decision-maker should make a written
decision within the two-month deadline but need not issue a detailed written
opinion.

210. In the interest of timely decisions, it is necessary to limit the parties to biological
parents.Biological grandparents who want to raise the child should not have standing unless both
birth parents are deceased or they are the child's legal guardians.
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There should be a limited right of appeal which would serve as a check
on individual error and bias on the part of the decision-maker. It would also
avoid the possibility of outcry for failure to include what U.S. citizens have
come to expect as part of due process: some form of appellate review. One
could argue that such review would cause unnecessary delay and that there are
many instances of non-reviewable governmental decisions. Nevertheless, if the
review were extremely limited, it would serve the purposes of justice and
politics without sacrificing the goal of speedy resolution.
A board set up by the accredited authority should conduct the review. To
ensure proficiency, the board should consist of one social worker trained in
intercountry adoption, one attorney with experience in family law but without
any income stemming from the representation of parties in adoption proceedings of any sort,2" ' and the director of the accredited agency whose sole
function would be to break a tie vote between the other two members. To
assure timely decisions, the review should be based solely on the transcription
of the proceedings, which should be made available within one week of the
final hearing. Further, review should be granted only when a party files a
proper request within two weeks of the final hearing, and review should take
place within two weeks of the request. The process should not be de novo; it
should be a search for any material error of law or fact or element of bias that
is visible in the record (including the written opinion if any was issued).
The original decision should stand unless error or bias is uncovered and
then only if such error or bias were so material that a grave miscarriage of
justice would ensue if the original decision were carried out. Unless the review
panel were to differ with the original decision, there would be no need for a
written decision by the review panel. In cases of error or bias, the review
panel should conduct a new hearing appropriate to the second stage of the
adjudication. That is, the panel should schedule briefs and oral arguments
regarding the issues of consent and adoptability (temporary placement of the
child having been decided). In these instances, the review panel should issue
a final decision within one month of its determination to conduct a new
proceeding. There would be no right of review of this decision. Finally,
judicial review should be limited to extraordinary cases involving alleged
errors of constitutional proportion. Only the most grievous deprivations of
parental liberties under the Due Process Clause would qualify.2 2 Without

211. A retired attorney with much experience in adoption would be an ideal choice for this
position on the board.
212. There is an analog to this procedure in antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Under
provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reflected in U.S. law,
administrative decisions by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade
Commission involving either Canadian or Mexican goods are not reviewable in U.S. courts if one
party to the administrative proceeding requests review under NAFTA. Review under NAFTA
consists of binational panel review. That is, the review panel is composed of members from the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/3

42

Maravel: Intercountry Adoption and the Flight from Unwed Fathers' Rights:

1997]

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

this very high threshold for constitutional review, automatic resort to judicial
bypass would undercut the entire proposed scheme.
Assuming the United States ratifies the Hague Convention, actions to
implement the Convention's explicit provisions will become necessary. For
example, Congress will have to enact federal legislation to authorize creation
of the required Central Authority." 3 Implementing legislation may, of
course, go beyond Convention requirements to address related matters. In
implementing the Convention's requirements, federal legislation should make
clear that federal law as to adjudication of consent in intercountry adoptions
would preempt state law. Requiring that convention authorities grant deference
to local law standards for proving paternity and withholding consent would
enhance the political feasibility of such a preemption measure. The applicable
local law would be that of the state in which a convention authority sits.
Legislative preemption is crucial. Without it a putative father could circumvent
any of the Convention's speedy adjudication mechanisms by requesting that a
state court enjoin the convention authority until the court decides the issues of
paternity, consent, and custody.
Federal legislation should also clearly indicate the penalty for failure to
resort to Convention procedures. A father wishing to contest an intercountry
adoption who chooses not to proceed under the Hague Convention would
automatically and without exception lose any right he might have had under
state law to withhold his consent. Once the deadline for filing notice of intent
to withhold consent had passed, without any notice having been filed with
respect to the child, the convention authority would be able to assert legally
under Article 4 that all necessary consents had been obtained.
3. Proposed Criteriafor Deciding Temporary Placement
One of the most important ways in which procedures under the Hague
Convention may improve upon existing domestic law is to revise the standards
for deciding temporary placement. The interim placements of "Baby Jessica"
and "Baby Richard" with their prospective adoptive parents created misery for
all involved. Prior to the final custody award, the biological parents suffered,
and afterwards, when the children were taken from their adoptive homes
additional lives were shattered. The Uniform Adoption Act does not adequately address this most important issue." 4 The Act leaves interim placements
two countries involved in the dispute. The only exception is for constitutional challenges. 19
U.S.C. § 1516a (1994).
213. See Richard R. Carlson, The EmergingLaw of IntercountryAdoptions: An Analysis of
the Hague Conference on IntercountryAdoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243 (1994); Pfund, supra note
1, at 66-74. Many other changes will be necessary, such as those concerning immigration, or
desirable, such as requirements for converting a simple adoption (in those countries in which
adoption does not cut off parental rights) into a full adoption (as in the United States where
adoption terminates prior parental rights).
214. The Act merely authorizes a judge in a contested adoption or in a termination
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under the traditional "best interest of the child" standard. I suggest a different
standard for use under the Hague Convention and ultimately in domestic law,
215
because the best interest of the child standard usually favors continuity,
as it did in the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases. As this is a complete
break with current approaches in adoption and other child custody disputes,
there follows a detailed model of a temporary placement hearing with specific
direction as to the standard for placement. The heart of this new standard is
a placement that poses the least risk of separation trauma for the child upon
final decision.
In Hague Convention proceedings, if a putative father files a timely notice
of intent to withhold consent to an intercountry adoption, the first step of the
expedited proceedings should be a temporary placement hearing akin to a
preliminary injunction hearing. The classic criteria for affording such
extraordinary relief are: (1) petitioner's likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) the likelihood that petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary
relief; (3) whether the harm to the petitioner absent such relief outweighs harm
to the respondent from granting such relief; and (4) whether relief is in the
public interest.2" 6 These criteria are easily adaptable to the adoption situation
and are suitable guides for a temporary placement decision. Surely they are
more effective for making placement decisions than the ubiquitous, elusive
standard known as "the best interest of the child." The adaptation to the
temporary child placement hearing would not, of course, ignore best interest
concerns. Rather, the adaptation simply parses the analysis in more concrete
terms. Furthermore, the adaptation combines the best interest standard with all
other relevant factors. This combination is in stark contrast to some commentators' views which suggest that the best interest of the child standard be
removed from consent determinations." 7 Such a combination is also contrary
to some decisional law which treats consent as a very separate issue from the
question of which placement is in a child's best interest."
Specifically, child placement decisions should be governed by the
following standards:

proceeding to make an interim placement order in the best interest of the child. The comment
clearly recognizes the need for the court to take an active role to protect the welfare of the child,
but gives no direction whatsoever. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-204 & cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 41
(Supp. 1996) (authorizing interim placement in uncontested proceeding).
215. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
216. See 1 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948
(2d ed. 1995).
217. See, e.g., Shanley, supra note 200, at 80-81.
218. See, e.g., In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). It is interesting in this, the Baby
Jessica case, that the interim placement did not reflect the Supreme Court of Iowa's firm belief
that the child's interest could not be part of its decision. See id.
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(1) the likelihood that the putative father would prevail in arguing his
right to withhold his consent under the applicable state law;
(2) the balance of harm to the putative father if relief is not granted and
to the prospective adoptive parent(s), if any, with whom the child has already
been placed;
(3) the harm to the child posed by placement with either the putative
father or the prospective adoptive parent(s); and
(4) whether public policies concerning adoption favor one placement over
another.
In this legal framework factors one and three should be predominant.
Evidence as to the likelihood that the father will prevail on the merits would
also indicate which placement would be more harmful to the child. If the
father is likely to prevail, the probability of psychological harm to the child
from separation trauma after placement with prospective adoptive parents is
high. Conversely, if the father is not likely to prevail, placement with him
pending a final determination would pose a greater risk of harm to the child.
Thus, the decision-maker should focus primarily on the temporary placement
that is most likely to be the permanent placement.
A decisional framework that puts risk of harm to the child in the foremost
position is a very different legal inquiry than one that seeks to determine
which parent or set of parents is better suited to raising the child. In the
suggested standards for consent adjudications under the Hague Convention, the
interest of the child is paramount, but the analysis is limited to deciding which
placement poses the least risk of separation trauma upon final decision of the
consent issue. If a biological father can prove that he has the right under the
relevant domestic law to withhold his consent to adoption, then his relative
suitability as a parent (compared with the prospective adoptive parents) is
irrelevant. His child is not adoptable within the meaning of the Convention
which leaves the definition of that term to local law.21 9 Of course, most
jurisdictions in the United States do not require the consent of a biological
parent who has abandoned the child or is otherwise an unfit parent3 ° The

219. See Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(a), at 1139.
220. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. § 111(2)(a), (d) (McKinney 1988) (providing that consent
is not required if able parent fails to visit and communicate with child or if mental illness or
retardation disables the parent from providing proper care). The Uniform Adoption Act sets out
several situations in which a court may dispense with consent. One exists for individuals whose
parental relationship has been judicially terminated. The comment makes clear that the
termination may have occurred previously under a state's general termination statute or under the
Adoption Act's termination provision. The latter provides for termination for a variety of reasons
including one relatively new ground, violence demonstrating unfitness to maintain a parental
relationship. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr §§ 2-402 & cmt., 3-504 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 28-29, 52-54
(Supp. 1996).
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father's suitability as a parent is, therefore, an implicit factor in application of
the relevant consent law.
The avoidance of separation trauma as a decisive criterion for temporary
placement does not exist in a psychological or social vacuum. Vast literature
exists regarding the damage children suffer when they are removed from a
parent." The negative effects can take many forms. In general, one must
distinguish between separation from a biological parent and separation from
a psychological parent in assessing the literature.m There is no need,
however, to take sides in the on-going debate about the relative importance of
these two sets of relationships' because the suggested Hague Convention
221. See, e.g., David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3, 6-10 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990);
Vera I. Fahlberg, A DevelopmentalApproachto Separation/Loss,in ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 27 (Euthymia D. Hibbs ed., 1991); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]; JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]; Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the
Search, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 62, 72-74 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D.
Schechter eds., 1990); Leon J. Yarrow & Marion S. Goodwin, The Immediate Impact of
Separation:Reactions of Infants to a Change in Mother Figures, in THE COMPETENT INFANT
1032 (L. Joseph Stone et al. eds., 1973). There is even a standard psychological test called the
"Separation Anxiety Test" that measures attachment and its impairment. See, e.g., Lori J.
Horlacher, Attachment Impairment: A Comparison of Adopted and Nonadopted Adolescents in
Therapy With Those Not in Therapy (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, United States
International University) (abstracted in DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL, Vol. 50/05-B,
2624).
222. The concept of a psychological parent is well set forth in the work of Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit. These authors define the psychological parent-child relationship
based on provision for the day-to-day needs of the child. GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supranote 221, at 16-20. Only by providing this care may a biologic parent become
the psychological parent Id. 'at 17. It is the resulting tie to the psychological parent, however,
that is key. Id. at 31-32.
Importantly, these experts do not distinguish between birth parents, adoptive parents, and
other longtime caregivers in positing the need to protect any established familial ties from state
intrusion. GOLDSTmIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 10-11. The announced
purposes behind preventing unnecessary state intrusion are to provide parents with an opportunity
to meet the developing physical and emotional needs of their child (such an opportunity is
essential in the establishment of familial bonds critical to every child's healthy growth and
development), and to continuously maintain a psychological parent-child relationship. Id. at 9-10.
The child's needs are paramount. Id. at 5.
223. Compare, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 41
(stressing importance of avoiding separation from psychological parent) with Carl Schoenberg,
On Adoption and Identity, 53 J. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE AM. 549 (1974) (stressing inherent
identity problems in families based on psychological rather than blood ties).
The rationales posited by both sides do, however, shed light on the need for the present
proposal from both perspectives. Focusing first on the trauma of separation from a birth parent
with whom the child has not had an opportunity to develop a relationship, there is some evidence
that closed adoption interferes with a child's identity formation. Depriving an adoptee of the
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knowledge of biological parentage creates conflicts that result in feelings of shame, embarrassment, and low self-esteem. Arthur D. Sorosky et al., Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 18-27 (1975). See also JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS (1973)
(giving empirical data from one study regarding connections between an adoptee's search and low
self-esteem). Adoptees may suffer from a deep fear of loss and separation. Annette Baran &
Reuben Pannor, Perspectiveson OpenAdoption, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 119, 120 (1993).
In childhood, adoptees may suffer from uncertainty as to their family status, fearing loss ofplace
with their adoptive family and reconnection with their birth family. David M. Brodzinsky et al.,
Psychologicaland Academic Adjustment in Adopted Children, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 582 (1984). Adoptees have a high incidence of emotional disturbance and need for
mental health services in adolescence. Marianne Berry, Risks andBenefits of Open Adoption, 3
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125, 127 (1993) (citing to the mental health literature). A review of
sixty-six published studies showed that adoptees had a significantly higher level of maladjustment.
Michael Wierzbicki, PsychologicalAdjustment of Adoptees: A Meta-Analysis, 22 J. CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 447-454 (1993).
Some critics of this literature focus on its flaws in empirical design, such as inadequate
sampling and clinical bias. See, e.g., ELZaETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS 174-86 (1993).
Others merely cite the need for further empirical work. See, e.g., Berry, supraat 125. A current
review reveals that some recent research is focusing on a multidimensional model that seems to
respond to the earlier criticism of methodology. David M. Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes in
Adoption, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 153, 160-62 (1993) (formulating a stress and coping
model which incorporates many variables).
Focusing next on the trauma of separation from a parent with whom a child has developed
a relationship, short-term and long-term detriments to the child became clear. "So long as a child
is a member of a functioning family, his paramount interest lies in the preservation of his
family." GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 5. Effects on children of
separation differ depending on age. 1d. at 45. Short-term detriments often include disturbances
in sleep, behavior, attention, and school performance. Id. at 43-44. Long-term effects of
disruption in the continuity of care range from impairments of emotional development (infants
and toddlers) to breakdowns in verbal skills (young children) to behavior disorders (school-age
children), GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 32-34. Even where the
"replacement" parent is ideal, he or she may not be able "to heal completely, without emotional
scarring, the injury sustained by the loss [of the first psychological parent to a young child]." Id.
at 40-41. Many theoretical perspectives come into play including psychoanalytic theory, trauma
theory, and attachment theory. See, e.g., K. Gilmore, Gender IdentityDisorderin a Girl:Insights
From Adoption, 43 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 39-59 (1995) (identifying clear evidence of
separation trauma from a late adoption in one case of gender identity disorder); Dennis Drotar
& Edward R. Stege, PsychologicalTestimony in Foster ParentAdoption: A Case Report, 17 J.
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 164, 165-66 (1988) (giving testimony indicating that separation of
13-month-old infant would pose significant psychological stress based on attachment theory); S.
Wells, Post-TraumaticStress Disorder in Birth Mothers, 17 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 30-32
(1993) (noting recent work on profound, long-term effects on mothers and children). To promote
continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influences that are essential to a
child's normal development and to prevent the damage caused by disruptions, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit, preeminent experts in the area of the "best interest of the child" standard, propose
that adoptions should be final from the moment of placement. GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 31-32. "When infants and young children find themselves
abandoned by the parent, they not only suffer separation distress and anxiety but also setbacks
in the quality of their next attachments, which will be less trustful." Id. at 33.
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criterion seeks to avoid the trauma of separation in any form, whether from
a birth or other parent.
The risk of harm to a child from separation trauma must be evaluated in
light of the length of time a child has been living with a parent or set of
parents. 4 The criteria for a temporary placement decision must make it
clear, however, that the risk of separation trauma at the end of the decisional
process is the primary concern. It is easy to foresee that a decision-maker may
be loathe to inflict separation trauma on a child before a final decision for fear
that the ultimate result may not require any separation at all. The new
framework must, therefore, state that separation at an early stage of the
process is considered as a matter of law to be less harmful to a child than
separation at a later date after further bonding between child and parent(s) has
occurred. Correct decisions made early in the process should be the goal.
In the hierarchy of suggested factors, this author proposes that the effect
on the adult parties be given relatively little weight except in extreme
circumstances. That said, the decision-maker should likewise consider the
length of time a child has been placed with prospective adoptive parents as
relevant to the harm a change in placement would cause them. The decisionmaker should likewise evaluate the harm to the father that continued placement
with the prospective adoptive parents would cause him. For purposes of
illustration, consider a situation in which the child is living at a considerable
distance from the biological father's home and place of work. This situation
might create an extremely difficult choice for him: maintaining a stable home
and economic future should he be allowed to raise his child versus developing
and maintaining a relationship with his child who is at a crucial stage in
development. The latter option, of course, would only be possible if the father
were to be allowed visitation. Again, the decision-maker should consider these
matters, but the temporary placement decision should rest primarily on where
permanent placement is likely to fall. Allowing evidence of harm to the adults
is merely an escape valve for the pressure on the decision-maker in very
unusual situations. It should be understood that separating a child from the
prospective adoptive parents pendente lite will hurt them but that this potential
for harm does not rise to the same level of legal cognizance as the risk of
harm to the child caused by separation from them later after formation of a
significant familial bond.
Similarly, consideration of whether public policy favors one placement
over another should not merit the same weight as the risk assessment and
probability of eventual adoptability of the child. Giving the public policy factor
equal weight would pose a threat to the critical importance of individualized
risk assessment. It could, on the one hand, give far too inuch discretion to the
decision-maker who may, as a person trained to facilitate intercountry

224. See GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 221, at 48.
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adoption, have an attitude favoring adoption. On the other hand, it could
constrain the decision-maker if temporary placements in analogous prior
domestic adoption cases seem to present a policy favoring a particular
placement. As in the factor allowing consideration of harm to the adults
involved, our new decisional framework should clearly define adoption policy
as less determinative. If, for example, domestic adoption policy were to favor
two-parent families, disfavor homosexual parents, or encourage religious
matching, it would not be prudent to allow these factors to displace the single
legal criterion meant to guide the expedited pre-adoption proceeding: whether
the child is adoptable by virtue of the required legal consents having been duly
obtained.
Then why include policy as a criterion at all? Public policy is included in
the decisional framework because the Hague Convention does not attempt to
set up standards for adoptability and consent or other substantive legal norms.
It leaves such matters to each contracting party. Thus, if a state has a policy
that speaks clearly and directly to the question of whether a child should be
placed with the putative biological father or the prospective adoptive parents
pending resolution of consent litigation, there must be room in the Convention's decisional framework to consider it. It should not, however, be decisive.
If the Convention is ratified and implemented in the United States, it will have
a legal status equal to federal law and should preempt state law on this
particular matter. That is, placement decisions in intercountry adoptions in
which consent is an issue should be based on placement procedures invented
specifically for use under the Convention. Those procedures should rest on
assessment of the risk to the child in each case and consider public policy only
to the extent that it speaks to the issue of relative risk of separation trauma.
The Hague Convention creates a legal space in which procedures for
regulating intercountry adoption may grow in new directions avoiding pitfalls
encountered in current domestic law. Deference to domestic law on the matter
of temporary placement of a child pending resolution of a consent conflict
would be a grave error. The Convention keenly allows states to maintain
domestic standards on adoptability and consent, but it does not forego the
opportunity to prevent the manifest harm that has already occurred from
domestic failures to invent speedy mechanisms to adjudicate consent in
adoption.
C. How Hague Convention Consent Mechanisms Provide a Domestic Law
Model
The problem of international flight gives a powerful reason for the U.S.
Senate to ratify the Hague Convention and implement it with the procedural
mechanisms outlined above. Regardless of whether the U.S. Senate ratifies the
Hague Convention, the administrative adjudication process outlined above can
still serve as a model for solving the problems of protracted consent litigation
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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in purely domestic adoption scenarios. In fact, cases such as the Baby Jessica
case with its interstate dimension serve as analogs to the intercountry adoption
conflict. Thus, the Hague Convention mechanisms suggested above are also
suitable for domestic consent battles. Domestic legislatures must face the
reality of crowded court dockets, the possibility of sequential litigation in
multiple states, and the probability that a child's fate and psychological
development may be put in a dangerous state of indeterminate suspension.
Such situations call for adoption by all states of a uniform law on consent and

its adjudication. The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act is one model, but the author
respectfully submits that the Hague Convention mechanisms would be a better
option. " 5
Again, states may adopt the suggested mechanisms with or without

ratification of the Convention. It would be advisable, however, for legislatures
to confer jurisdiction over paternal consent adjudications on a special tribunal,
such as the Hague Convention's accredited authorities, similar in nature to the
appointment of a master in federal court. This tribunal would act within the
domestic court structure and budget, but without the constraints of judicial

225. The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act recognizes the importance of uniformity in domestic
adoption:
At present, the legal process ofadoption is complicated not only by the different
kinds of children who are adopted and the different kinds of people who seek to
adopt, but also by an extraordinarily confusing system of state, federal, and
international laws and regulations. Despite allegedly common goals, state adoption
laws are not and never have been uniform, and there now appear to be more
inconsistencies than ever from one state to another. There are no clear answers to
such basic questions as who may place a child for adoption, whose consent is required
and when is consentfinal, how much money can be paid to whom and for what, how
much information can or should be shared between birth and adoptive families, what
makes an individual suitable as an adoptive parent, and what efforts are needed to
encourage the permanent placement of minority children and other children with
special needs who languish in foster care. Hundreds of thousands of children in this
country need permanent homes, and hundreds of thousands of adults have at least
some interest in adoption but are often discouraged by the confusing laws and
procedures as well as by high financial and emotional costs.
UNIF. ADOPTION Acr, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
In furtherance of its goals, the Act contains uniform standards and procedures for obtaining
parental consent and terminating parental rights. UNiF. ADOPTION Acr §§ 2-401 to 409, 3-501
to 506 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 27-38, 50-56 (Supp. 1996). However, the Act does not adequately
address that most important decision of temporary placement of the child while consent and
termination are being adjudicated. See supranotes 214-15 and accompanying text. Similarly, the
Act acknowledges that expedition is desirable, but it does not place time limits on the
consent/termination decision. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-504(c) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 53 (Supp.
1996); see also supra note 202. The uniformity sought by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should be supplemented by a uniform approach to the
problem of temporary placement like the preceding proposals for Hague Convention mechanisms.
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procedures. The procedures of the special tribunal would be those outlined in
section III-B above.
The Constitution's guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the termination of parental rights" 6 is in apparent conflict with
tribunal jurisdiction. The conflict disappears, however, when one recalls that
Supreme Court decisions have limited the process due unwed fathers.227 In
the end, the need for a prompt and stable adoption justifies a quasi-judicial
approach with procedures specially tailored to the situation."
Joan H. Hollinger, the drafting committee reporter for the 1994 Uniform
Adoption Law, has noted that the current widespread interest in achieving
uniformity in adoption law depends on a reconstruction of the institution in six
contentious areas, one of which is parental consent. 9 In Hollinger's
opinion, the resistance of the law to uniformity rests upon the lack of a
sufficient consensus regarding how the legal system should respond to the
changing psychological and social characteristics and needs of today's birth
parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees.230 Reaching consensus on adoption
law as a whole may depend on incremental agreement on particularly troublesome issues such as extensive litigation of paternal consent at the expense of
young children. It is hoped that the suggested Hague Convention mechanisms
will provide just such an incremental step towards consensus.
Creating a new quasi-judicial body for the limited purpose of deciding
consent' and temporary placement issues would avoid the delay inherent in
traditional adjudication. 31 The use of trained administrative officials for this

226. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES 862-65 & n.63 (2d ed. 1988).
227. See discussion of the decisions supra Part II-A.
228. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such a tribunal and its streamlined
procedures, see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text. A biological father who has not
developed a relationship with his child has no parental rights and is due no process at all as long
as the state has not denied him an opportunity to "vest" his right. It is true that the decision in
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), does not address precisely what process is due a
biological father who has acquired parental rights by grasping his opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (terminating parental
rights in a non-adoption case only upon clear and convincing evidence of statutory ground). It
is also true, however, that the Constitution allows the decision as to the existence of parental
rights of men such as Jonathan Lehr to be made with no judicial process at all; Lehr had no "day
in court" on the issue of his paternal rights because he was not entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard in the adoption under New York's statute.
229. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, AdoptionLaw, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 43, 55-56 (1993).
230. Id. at 46-47.
231. It is interesting to note here the historic evolution of courts dealing with family matters.
The creation of special juvenile courts was premised on much the same intention as my "consent
tribunal," to take certain types of sensitive family matters from the traditional judicial realm. See
Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and FamilyLaw, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1135, 1153. Over time,
however, family courts have become part of the traditional legal structure with much of the delay
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type of decision-making is preferable to the use of judges who are accustomed
to the extensive trial procedures that the streamlined tribunal process intends
to avoid. Despite their high profile, there are relatively few reported cases of
the Baby Jessica type. 2 It stands to reason that the tribunal's work would
be limited to a small number of contested consents. With a small "docket," a
streamlined process, and the use of the interim placement standards described
in subsection llI-B-3 above, the special tribunal would accomplish its task with
more speed and less pain to all concerned.
On the other hand, if the U.S. Senate does ratify the Hague Convention
with the above suggestions incorporated in its implementing legislation, there
would be two additional avenues of possible influence upon domestic law.
First, there would be the possibility of incorporating less than the entire set of
Hague mechanisms into individual state law. For example, the
computer-linked, putative father registry among all accredited convention
authorities could provide a model for a similar linkage horizontally between
state agencies and even vertically among state agencies and accredited
authorities. Further, the sharing of information between accredited convention
and state authorities would be one of the limited uses allowed for information
provided by putative fathers identifying themselves. This shared information
would benefit everyone involved in both domestic and intercountry adoptions
when paternal consent poses a potential problem.
On a more substantive and important level, ratification of the Convention
could provide an incentive for a more radical restructuring of domestic law.
In implementing the Convention, the Senate could choose to adopt one,
uniform national standard for when an unwed father may withhold consent to
an intercountry adoption. This would enable all accredited convention
authorities to be trained in and apply the same substantive law regarding when
a putative father may block an adoption and obtain custody. Such a standard
would necessarily preempt the various state standards that currently exist. That
is, in the intercountry adoption process, a convention authority would have to
apply the national standard in adjudicating whether all consents required by
domestic law had been duly obtained.
Presumably the federal standard could also be made to apply to interstate
conflicts and thereby serve to discourage a biological mother's flight from her
own domestic jurisdiction to another with lesser protections for putative
fathers. Moreover, the enactment of a uniform consent standard and uniform
consent adjudication procedures would facilitate the intercountry adoption

and procedural complexity of other courts. Part of my aim in setting out explicitly expeditious,
non-judicialprocedures is to prevent the evolution of this new body into a judicial forum. The
evolution of arbitration into an entity with many of litigation's trappings that it was intended to
avoid presents a cautionary example.
232. See supra Part II-A.
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process while protecting the interests of putative fathers. In the expedited
Convention adjudication process, there would be no need to waste precious
time arguing for the application of a particular consent standard. The standard
would be readily extracted from the federal legislation and immediately applied
in the adjudication process.
Given the relative rarity of intercountry adoption of children born to U.S.
parents,3 3 the enactment of a federal uniform consent standard directed at
intercountry adoptions would have much less impact on domestic law than the
enactment of a uniform consent standard applicable to purely domestic
adoptions. The federal standard could, however, serve as a model for a
uniform domestic law on paternal consent standards to complement the
uniform procedural reforms. States would be given a well-thought-out solution
on which to base their legislative decisions. Enactment of a federal intercountry adoption consent standard without any consequent changes in domestic
adoption law, however, would further fragment an already complex web of
legal rules. Today, it is unlikely that either judges or unwed fathers know
exactly what behavior will cause inchoate paternal rights to become complete
and vest. The domestic standards are too vague and vary too much across
jurisdictional lines.3 4 In the interest of more concrete laws by which citizens
may order their lives and by which adjudicators may reach fair and consistent
decisions, the Senate should enact a national adoption consent standard for all
adoptions." This standard would preempt substantive state law as to when
and how an unwed father may withhold his consent to any adoption, whether
domestic or intercountry.
Adopting a national consent standard would be justified on the basis of
facilitating administration of an international treaty to which the United States
is a party. It would also have the beneficent effect of avoiding interstate
conflicts and interstate flight during contested adoptions. It would prevent any
harm to future Baby Jessicas that might result from the inevitably long time
it could otherwise take for a significant number of jurisdictions to adopt a
uniform standard. If we can prevent even one more case of unnecessary
separation trauma, then concerted federal action is worth the political effort it
would take to make a national standard palatable to the states.

233. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 72. Actually, it is known that the United States is a major
"receiving nation," but the lack of exit statistics makes exact characterization of the nation's
status as a "sending nation" difficult. Id.
234. Compare IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-1.5-12 to -16 (Michie Supp. 1996), andNEB. REv.
STAT. § 43-104.02 (1993) (setting forth clear but limited standards for right to veto adoption),
with In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990) and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/8(a) (West Supp. 1996) (imposing more inclusive but less clear standards for determining right
to veto adoption and gain custody).
235. See discussion supra Part II-C.
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One may well ask whether national uniformity is really necessary to
prevent future cases such as those of Baby Jessica and Baby Richard? There
are several reasons why federal action may be desirable even though it would
come at the expense of lost local autonomy. The first is that individual state
legislatures may be pressed to act quickly in the intense glare of the public
spotlight which illuminates the relatively infrequent but extremely dramatic
cases such as Baby Jessica or Baby Richard. A rapid response may be
politically necessary, yet it may not yield an adjustment in the law that is
appropriate. The public may believe that children such as Baby Jessica should
not have to leave their adoptive families,"s but it does not follow that the
appropriate legal solution is to keep such children in their adoptive homes
rather than prevent their placement for adoption in the first place.
Public pressure in the wake of the Baby Richard decision compelled the
Illinois legislature to enact various amendments to the adoption laws,"l one
of which required a custody hearing, based on the best interests of the child,
to be held promptly after an adoption was vacated. 8 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that this provision was not retroactive with respect to Baby Richard. 9 Nonetheless, the initial, hasty legislative response was ill-advised. It
prolonged litigation devastating to everyone involved, especially the child. It
created an incentive for delay in all contested adoption cases that would
reward (albeit perhaps only temporarily) marathon litigants with whom the
child initially resided. The Illinois Legislature has yet to correct its inappropriate response to public pressure.' ° Thus, local autonomy gave way to
political grandstanding rather than reasoned lawmaking. Just as children need
a suitable, stable home, they also need a well-considered, settled adoption law
that provides a rational, predictable basis for their permanent placement.

236. Sandra Sanchez, Sentiment StrongAgainstJessicaRuling, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 1993,
at IA (citing poll in which 78 % of 672 persons stated that toddler should have been able to stay
with people who raised her).
237. Carmen D. Caruso, Baby Richard Cases: A Legislative Solution, CHIC. LAW., July
1995, at 12 (arguing that "nature provides nine months to settle such disputes and that there
should be no painful litigation after birth").
238. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Pub. Act 88-550, § 975, 1994 Ill. Laws 368,
410-11 (amended 1995). The applicable provision is now codified in the Illinois Adoption Act,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20 (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that a hearing be held in
accordance with Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act which in turn requires
custody determinations to be made in the best interest of the child, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/602 (West Supp. 1996)).
239. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 336-37.
240. The provision for a custody hearing following a vacated adoption order remains intact.
Amendments to the Adoption Act in 1995 afforded an opportunity for correction, but the
legislature chose only a clerical approach. See Act of May 19, 1995, Pub. Act 89-315, 1995 I11.
Laws 3430, 3441-42.
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Politically pressured action is the first reason why federal rather than local
action may be the best course. The second reason stems from local inaction.
Some legislatures have been unable to respond to the thorny problem of
paternal consent. The New York Court of Appeals invalidated its state's statute
in 1990 and created a judicial standard for paternal consent, expressly intended
as an interim measure pending legislative response."4 It is now 1997, and
the New York Legislature has not revised the statute. This inaction does not
represent social experimentation so much as legislative paralysis. Local
autonomy deserves little protection where it is not exercised.
Another area of inaction presents the third reason in favor of federal
preemption. States have failed to respond quickly to the need for uniformity
across the entire spectrum of adoption law, a need that has long been
recognized by adoption professionals and the public.242 Although uniformity
is needed beyond the small class of cases such as Baby Jessica and Baby
Richard, their judicial spectacle has tended to obscure the need for broader
reform. A linkage between prevention of such cases and a comprehensive,
national approach to adoption law is the first step toward reforming the
institution of adoption itself.
Finally, the constitutional nature of the interests at stake merits a federal
response. Evidencing this fact, many state court decisions interpreting state
law in this area of parental rights rest on Supreme Court interpretations of
constitutional requirements.243 On the other hand, some recent legislative
responses show a lack of sensitivity to the constitutional parameters. For
example, attempts to require birth mothers to name biological fathers2 run
the risk of trampling privacy rights. In contrast, the Uniform Adoption Act
specifically protects a woman's right to remain silent when asked to name the
biological father.245 The Uniform Act's approach reflects a careful and
thoughtful balancing of the interests of mothers, fathers, and children. 6
Federal reliance on the Uniform Act's approach to paternal consent would
insure a calm, well-reasoned national standard. It would also insure a standard
that actually reflected federal and state constitutional decisions on the status

241. In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418,427 (N.Y. 1990); see also supra notes 64-72
and accompanying text.
242. See Charles Ornstein, Lawmakers'Attempts to Reform Adoption Laws Stall: Six States
IntroducedAct None PassedIt,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 1995, at 4A; Hollinger, supra
note 229, at 45-46.
243. See, e.g., In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990).
244. One example is a recent Illinois bill to require single mothers to name fathers on the
state putative father registry except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother. S.B. 1140,
89th Gen. Ass'y, 1995-96 Sess., (I11.1995). The Senate deleted this bill before its passage as an
amendment to the Adoption Act.
245. UNiF. ADoPTION AcT § 3-404 & cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 48-49 (Supp. 1996).
246. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

55

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:497

of unwed fathers in adoption proceedings as well as state statutes on the
termination of parental rights.47
There is precedent for the federal government setting national standards
in the area of family law where there is an interstate or intercountry dimension
to a problem warranting a federal response."4 Such action has not opened
a floodgate of federal intrusion into family autonomy. While the problem of
intercountry flight from paternal rights may be solved without federal
preemption of state law in either intercountry or domestic adoptions, this
discrete problem may be a unique opportunity to harmonize state law.
IV. REWORKING THE U.S. RIGHTS EQUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

If we were to leave the matter here, we would be losing a precious chance
to use international law as a catalyst to reform domestic law on an even deeper
level. There is more to be found in international law on this issue than the
mere solution to the problems of cross-border flight or the use of new
international models of adjudication to ease the vexing domestic problem of

247. UNiF. ADOPTION Acr §§ 2-401 & cmt., 3-504 & cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 27-28, 52-55
(Supp. 1996). Section 2-401 requires the consent of a man who did not marry the mother prior
to the birth if he has been judicially determined to be the father or has signed a document that
establishes his parentage and he: (1) has provided support for the child within his means and has
visited or communicated with the child; (2) has married (or attempted to marry) the mother prior
to placement of the child; or (3) has received the child into his home and openly held the child
out as his own. Section 3-504 allows termination of the rights of men who have notice of the
termination proceeding and fail to file a claim for paternity within 20 days and of men who assert
parental rights over children under six months of age at the time of the adoption petition but have
failed to: (1) pay reasonable prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses within their means; (2) make
reasonable support payments for the child; (3) visit regularly with the child; and (4) manifest an
ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody if the child was not in the custody
of the other parent. Fathers may show that there were compelling reasons for not meeting these
behavioral standards, but courts may still terminate parental rights upon clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child and one of the following grounds for
termination exists: (1) inability or unwillingness to assume prompt legal and physical custody of
the child if the child is not in the custody of the other parent and to pay for the child's support;
(2) inability or unwillingness to maintain contact with and support a child living with the other
parent and a step-parent; (3) custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
psychological well-being of the child based on behavior of the respondent indicating unfitness to
maintain a parent-child relationship; or (4) failure to terminate would be detrimental to the child.
Section 3-504 builds on state laws and judicial decisions but adds a significant provision:
conviction for serious and violent offenses against the other parent may demonstrate that a parent
is unfit. Only a few states currently recognize this as a ground for termination. Id. § 3-504
cmt. at 55.
248. See, e.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994); Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994); International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994).
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protracted custody litigation in the context of adoption. The issue of unwed
fathers' fights is currently in flux. The problem is in the public eye which is
focused by the national media with each appearance of a Baby Jessica or Baby
Richard. Courts are inventing ad hoc solutions. The legislatures that are daring
enough to deal with the problem are struggling to find publicly acceptable
solutions. We must grab this legal moment to demonstrate that the focus is too
narrow and completely wrong. By looking to international law, we find a new
perspective and an evolving jurisprudence: the rights of children. If we use
international law as a vehicle to see this problem in a new light, we may find
new solutions that go far beyond the adoption context.
We should use this moment of outrage, uncertainty, and impending
change to rework the rights equation. Scholars of international law must offer
emerging international norms as a means to accomplish this task.
A. The Continuing Validity of a Rights Analysis
Before we rework the domestic rights equation in the adoption context,
we must address the reasons why it remains a good idea to devise solutions
that depend on a definition and a balancing of rights. Scholarship in family
law, as well as other areas of the law, has found the use of a rights analysis
to be unproductive. Scholars have argued that a narrow focus on rights
obstructs what society is trying to accomplish through law. For example,
Katharine Bartlett argues passionately and eloquently that grounding child
custody disputes predominantly in notions of responsibility rather than
individual rights (whether of parent or even child) will foster the more selfless
values of relationship that an inordinate emphasis on rights obscures. 24 9
Another scholar's radical call for a child-centered perspective on family law
specifically refuses to substitute children for adults as "autonomous rightsbearers in an adversarial system."" Feminist critiques of children's rights
focus on the patriarchal consequences"' and the excessive intervention in
female privacy and autonomy.212 On the other hand, rights analysis still
249. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293-95 & n.9 (1988)
(also offering a review of other critiques of existing rights doctrines for other reasons).
250. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents'Rights, 14 CARDozo L. Rv. 1747, 1756 (1993). Woodhouse argues that a childcentered perspective on parental authority would distinguish between parental obligation as a
"corollary of procreation" responsibility and parental authority as a "corollary of stewardship"
over the next generation. Id. at 1818. She purposefully avoids couching her argument in terms
of children's rights "because a child-centered perspective calls for a rhetoric that speaks less
about competing rights and more about adult responsibility and children's needs." Id. at 1841.
251. See Carol Smart, Powerand the Politicsof ChildCustody, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE
PoLIcs OF GENDER 1, 8-10 (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989) (advancing the
theory that children's interests in fathers prompt a patriarchal reconstruction).
252. Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of
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pervades recent family law scholarship. 3 While the vast literature on the
role of rights in the law is of tremendous intellectual interest (and well beyond
the scope of this article), 4 there are two basic reasons for the continuing
validity of a simple rights analysis.
The first is that legal scholarship must stay grounded in practical realities
if it is to have an impact beyond the academic realm. In the United States, our
history has shaped a public consciousness that is firmly rooted in individual
rights. Citizens of the United States have been taught, usually from a very
tender age, that the raisond'tre of government in this country is the existence
of certain inalienable rights. We learn from our Constitution that we have
rights that no entity or person may take from us. One may well argue that
such legal concepts appropriate to the eighteenth century are constraining a
society struggling to deal with twenty-first century problems. Nevertheless, we
must recognize that we are still a society steeped in this legal brew.
Whether one is debating gun control as an issue of the right to bear arms
or school codes of behavior as an issue of the right to express one's beliefs
freely, however publicly offensive they may be, one sees that the debate is still
framed in terms of rights and their infringement. Does it matter that these are
issues that arguably fit within specific constitutional rights? It matters only if
one is a constitutional scholar, a judge, or an advocate using the Constitution
to bolster one's argument. Outside the academy and the realm of lawyers is a
public that is not as finely attuned to such distinctions. In considering problems
of public policy, the layperson's trained response is to consider the question
as a matter of individual rights. Having carefully schooled our citizenry in
rights and correlative duties, we in the academy can ignore this perspective,
but only at our peril.
Any solution to a problem that ignores the U.S. public obsession with
individual rights will not be acceptable across the broad spectrum of public
opinion, and a solution for which there is not a broad consensus will, in the
long run, fail. This author posits that what seems to be a reactionary return to
an overly legalistic debate framed in terms of rights is actually a forwardlooking, pragmatic approach for a legalistic society grounded in the protection
of individual rights.
Just as we must accept the reality of a public focus on rights, we must
also accept the reality of a common-law system shaped by citizens litigating
from just this perspective. Judges deal with issues framed in terms of rights.
The resulting holdings are expressed in terms of rights. The adoption litigation

Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955, 964 (1991).
253. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:Against the Best Interestof the Child, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1987).
254. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RONALD DWORKIN
AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE (Marshall Cohen ed., 1984).
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at the heart of the present inquiry centers on rights. It would be a mistake to
pretend that rights are irrelevant to solving this thorny problem. The best way
to persuade a public, sympathetic to the miseries of children torn crying from
the arms of people they think are their parents, is to convince the public that
there are rights that are more important than the paternal rights being asserted
by biological fathers.
The second reason that we should continue a rights analysis is that the
legal debate is currently framed in terms of the rights of unwed, biological
fathers. We must now deal with the holdings of cases that protect paternal
rights based on biology. As will be discussed below, we must recognize the
potentially dangerous effect this elevation of paternal rights has on other
aspects of family law. If we simply argue that rights are the wrong approach,
we risk too much. These rights now exist. We must deal with rights arguments
directly in their own arena and win. The problem is how best to reach the
correct policy result in the adoption context without reaching the wrong policy
result in other contexts. To do this, we must parry the property-based rights
of fathers in their biological children with the rights of children to be raised
by biological parents who want them and who demonstrate the desire to be a
nurturing parent at the appropriate time. We must develop an acceptable
jurisprudence of children's rights to offset the dangerous legal reality of
biological rights expressed as a privilege of paternity.
B. The Dangers of Unwed Fathers' Rights in Domestic Law
The level of protection that U.S. law affords to the rights of unwed
fathers creates other problems besides cross-border flight of biological mothers
and prospective adoptive parents. It protects the unique biological connection
between parent and child for the wrong reason, and this threatens the wellbeing of children in non-adoption contexts by amplifying the power of the
biological parent. As a case in point, the failure of laws governing artificial
insemination to deal adequately with births that result from donated semen
leaves a child born from donated sperm in a precarious position. 5 In a
high-profile New York case, a sperm donor (and homosexual friend of the
lesbian mother) sought legal status as a parent when the biological mother
refused to grant him visitation on his own terms."56 The father had been
visiting with the child on the mother's terms since the child was three. 7

255. For example, New York statutes simply do not address the legal status of the fatherchild relationship where the mother was not married at the time of insemination. N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988).
256. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d
356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
257. Thomas S. acceded to an oral prenatal agreement with Robin Y. that he have no contact
or relationship with the child. Later, Robin Y. allowed him limited visitation. Thomas S., 599

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

59

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:497

The agreement regarding limited visitation broke down and litigation ensued.
By this time, the child was over ten years old. At trial, an expert testified that
detrimental emotional and psychological impact on the child would likely
result from the father's intrusion into her stable, two-parent, two-child
family. 8 Nevertheless, the father won an order of filiation and, thus, the
right to seek court-ordered visitation (and theoretically custody). The father's
statutory and constitutional rights of paternity dictated the result. 9 If the
law recognized a child's right to be raised and to maintain a relationship with
her biological father only when he asserted full parental responsibility at the
appropriately early stage of the child's life, then the harm to this child, this
family, and this father would have been avoided, and this conflict would not
have arisen.' 60
The dominance of biological rights poses harm to children in other ways.
For example, in New York, a biological parent can use that connection to
preempt a parental connection based on the realities of caring for a child.
There is nd standing in New York for a de facto parent (without the
connections of biology, marriage, or a legal order of adoption) to seek legal
custody or even visitation with respect to a child who has developed and
depended on a parent-child relationship with that person.2 6' The child suffers
most from the loss of this relationship. If we look at the situation from the

N.Y.S.2d at 378-79, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58.
258. The court-appointed psychiatrist recommended that there be no declaration of paternity
and no order of visitation. Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 380. It must be noted that the family
court which refused to grant the petition for filiation stressed this part of the psychiatrist's
testimony describing the negative effect on the child. Id. The family court also deferred to the
expert's opinion that maternal influence on the child's views did not mean she had been
"brainwashed." Id. On the other hand, the appellate court which mandated the order of filiation
stressed that part of the expert testimony that established a connection between the child's
expressed wish to sever contact with her father and maternal concerns expressed to her that
visitation posed an immediate threat to the stability of the household. Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d
at 362 (stating that if visitation were to occur, family therapy may ease the negative effects on
the child). This case happens to be a good example of quite different readings of the same
testimony by different jurists.
259. Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (concluding also that by fostering a relationship
between the child and her biological father, the mother was equitably estopped from denying the
father his parental rights).
260. His failure to assert parental responsibility from the moment of birth, even though by
agreement, would have taken him out of the class of biological parents to whom a child could
maintain a right of attachment. Regardless of the influence of this child's mother on her state of
mind, the intrusion of her father into her life through litigation posed what the child perceived
to be a serious threat. At that point, assertion of paternal rights was detrimental. If the right
belonged to the child, the guardian ad litem's recommendation (in concert with the courtappointed psychiatrist's recommendation) that the child not be forced to maintain a relationship
with her father against her will would have been controlling.
261. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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perspective of the fights of the child, we see the possibility for a better
outcome. If it is the child who has the rights, it is the child whose standing is
at issue (through a next friend or guardian ad litem). The child's right to be
raised by a biological parent should not necessarily translate into the extinguishment of other rights such as the right to be protected from the trauma of
unnecessary separation from an actual but non-biological parent. 62
If it is the child who has the rights, then her access to a relationship with
her biological parent is not dependent on any constitutional assessment of that
parent's liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In
1989, the Supreme Court refused to recognize any fundamental liberty interest
of an unwed father in his biological child born to a mother while she was
married to another man who himself claimed a paternal interest in the child,
despite the confirmed relationship between the biological father and the
child.' The plurality opinion rested its decision on historical, legal protection for the marital family. The plurality then addressed the child's assertion
of a due process right to maintain filial relationships with both her legal and
biological fathers. The plurality rejected that right and then addressed,
arguendo, her assertion of a liberty interest in maintaining a filial relationship
with her biological father regardless of her relationship with her legal father.
The latter claim failed as well. Justice Scalia reasoned that any rights asserted
by the child to a filial relationship with her unwed father were merely the
obverse of her biological father's. If he did not have a liberty interest in her,
then she could not have a liberty interest in him. By resting on historical
parental liberties, the plurality denied a child a relationship with a biological
father who had assumed a parental role since her birth.' 4 In an age of
redefinition of the family, 2" one can see the dangers that such an analysis
poses to new family configurations. 2"

262. The earliest secular acknowledgment that I have found of the importance of the bond
between a child and those who have actually raised her is in the letters of Elizabeth I. When she
was fifteen she wrote to protest the imprisonment of her governess, Katheryn Ashley. She
considered it her duty to speak for Ashley, reflecting upon Saint Gregory's admonition that "we
are more bound to them that bring us up well, than to our parents, for our parents do that which
is natural to them, that is, bringeth us into the world, but our bringers up are a cause to make
us live well in it." Letter from Princess Elizabeth to Protector Somerset (1547), in R. WEIGALL,
AN ELIZABETHAN GENTLEWOMAN (1911), reprintedin 800 YEARs OF WOMEN'S LETrERs 172-73
(Olga Kenyon ed., 1992).
263. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
264. The facts of the case are unusually complicated, as the changing nature of the adults'
relationships caused the situation to shift several times. Throughout the changing circumstances,
Michael H. held himself out as the child's father, visited with the child, contributed to her
support, and even lived with the child and her mother for a time. Id. at 113-14.
265. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing validity of adoption
by nonmarital partner of biological parent in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships).
266. The dissent criticized the plurality's "pinched conception of 'the family'" as being out
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Reworking the U.S. rights equation from the vantage of international law
and the rights of children offers a measure of protection not only against
constrained definitions of the family but also against recently proposed parental
rights legislation at the state and federal levels and proposed amendments to
state constitutions in twenty states.267 Such amendments aim to use parental
liberties to insulate parental actions and decisions from government interference. There are two situations in particular that are highly relevant to this
paper. The first is adoption-specific. An amendment that reads "[t]he right of
parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children shall not be
infringed,"268 could be interpreted as settling the problem of unwed paternal
consent in favor of an absolute veto. Thus, the father need not be willing to
raise the child himself but could prevent the adoption and shunt responsibility
for the child onto another. This is a patently unacceptable situation with threats
of tremendous detriment to the child. If, however, we recognize a child's right
to be raised by a parent who can and does assume full responsibility at a time
in the child's life when it is essential to development, we avoid the pitfalls of
the father's rights perspective, yet we protect the relationship of father and
child.
The second danger posed by proposals to elevate parental rights, possibly
including unwed paternal rights, has to do with political rhetoric. It may take
years to amend a state constitution and legislation may never pass. Nevertheless, such proposals may create a legal momentum and cause popular
sentiment to swing towards fathers' rights. 6 9 As the scales of public opinion
tilt upwards for fathers' rights, popular respect for the biological mother's
freedom of decision and the importance of the child's perspective may swing
downward. To steer clear of this potential outcome, we must focus on the
rights of children as the fulcrum for decision-making. That fulcrum must bear
the weight of many forces but it cannot do so from a traditional best interest
analysis. Such an analysis is simply too indeterminate. Any legal movement
that diverts attention from this solution at best delays legal reform and at worst
results in the wrong reform.
While the courts have addressed various rights of children under our
Constitution, they have not recognized the right to be raised by or to have a
relationship with a biological parent (much less a de facto parent). We must

of tune with prior decisions. Id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. Mike Allen, ConservativesLobby for ParentalRights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at
A10.
268. Id.
269. Popular sentiment was with the prospective adoptive parents in the Baby Jessica and
Baby Richard cases. Sanchez, supra note 236, at IA (citing poll in which 78% of 672 persons
surveyed stated that Baby Jessica should have been able to stay with people who raised her). It
is not difficult to speculate that popular sentiment might turn to favor biological fathers with a
change in political climate or media portrayal.
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look elsewhere for fundamental human rights that belong specifically to
children. In the realm of international law, with its firm emphasis on
individual human rights, children have found protection.
C. The Hope of Emerging International Jurisprudence on the Rights of
Children
It is certainly possible to look at the problems of unwed fathers' consents
through an analysis of parental rights under international law. Having already
established reasons for abandoning the perspective of paternal rights, this
article will look instead to children's rights under international law. By
recognizing international protections of the biological bonds between parents
and children from the perspective of children's rights,27 we find a basis for
reforming domestic law to attain a just result without risking unnecessary
damage to helpless infants or evolving family structures.
The task before us is to build a domestic jurisprudence of the rights of
children to be raised by biological parents if one or both are willing, able, and
fit to assume that responsibility from the moment of birth. The question is
whether such a right exists under international law. To answer it we must look
to an array of international instruments of varying authority. Although
international instruments on children's rights date back to the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child, otherwise known as the Declaration of Geneva
adopted by the League of Nations in 1924,271 there are more recent instruments that directly address current norms regarding the rights of children. The
right of a child to be raised by his or her biological parents as far as is
possible is apparent from the major international instruments. None of these
instruments, however, states unequivocally that a child has the right to be
raised by a biological parent as long as thatparent is willing, able, andfit to
do so from birth. This is, nevertheless, the standard that I seek to establish. I

270. My argument differs from one recent article on children's rights in the context of
intercountry adoption which argues that a child's right to choose a caring family "trumps"
biological ties that may prevent adoption. Stacie I. Strong, Children's Rights in Intercountry
Adoption: Towards a New Goal, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163 (1995). Ms. Strong argues that a child's
right to terminate biological parental rights, as recognized in some Western countries, should be
"introduced" into other non-Western nations to give children languishing in institutions without
hope of adoption in their own countries a chance to become part of a family. Id. at 186-89. Ms.
Strong addresses a very different situation than the one I address. She looks to children's rights
for an answer to the problem of parents who cannot or will not raise their children yet refuse to
allow adoption. I look to children's rights for an answer to the problem of choice where both a
biological parent and prospective adoptive parents wish to raise a newborn child. I aim to
strengthen biological ties that are real and viable, not those that exist in name and law alone.
271. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, League of Nations O.J. (1924), reprintedin THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: INTERNATIONAL INsTRuMENTs 3 (Maria Rita

Saulle & Flaminia Kojanec

eds., 1995).
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find support for this particular right in international law. From modem
international instruments on children's rights, we may draw strands that, when
woven together, constitute this very proposition. 2 2

Three major, recent international instruments addressing the rights of
children are the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children, With Special Reference to Foster
Placement and Adoption, 2' adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations (without vote) in 1986, the United Nations: Convention on the Rights
of the Child,274 adopted by the General Assembly (without vote) in 1989 and
entering into force in 1990, and the Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,275 adopted by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law in 1993 and entering into force in
2 76
1995. The U.N. Declaration is a non-binding statement of principles
adopted while the U.N. Convention was in the midst of its almost ten year
drafting process. 2' The U.N. Convention, however, is a document that
binds states that become parties and, in certain circumstances, states that sign
but have not yet ratified it.278 The Hague Convention is also a binding

272. "In cumulative impact, agreements between states play a crucial role in the development
of customary international law." LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (1989).
273. G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess. (1986), reprintedin 26 I.L.M. 1096 (1987)
[hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
274. Convention on the Rights of the Child, openedfor signatureJan. 26, 1990, G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. GAOR 61st plen. mtg. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), reprintedin 28 I.L.M.
1448 (1989), revised by 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter
U.N. Convention].
275. Hague Convention, supra note 7.
276. While the traditional view is that U.N. resolutions in general are not binding and do not
themselves constitute law, RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 103, cmt. c (1987), one must recognize that there is considerable debate
concerning this point. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND VORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 272 & n. 359 (1980). For example, the policy-oriented "New Haven School" takes the
position that General Assembly resolutions have the status of law as functional equivalents of
legislation when an analysis of a particular resolution's history, support, and expression yields
a conclusion of consolidated community expectations and commitment. Id. at 272-73. An example
of a resolution with the force of law is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See infra
note 312. The Restatement takes the more conservative position that resolutions may state
customary international law and that circumstances of adoption may entitle them to substantial
weight. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103,
cmt. c (1987).
277. The model text for the U.N. Convention was a 1979 draft submitted by Poland to the
Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. agency to which responsibility for drafting the
Convention had been delegated. The Working Group established by the Commission completed
the first draft of the Convention in 1988. Cynthia Price Cohen, Introductory Note to United
Nations: Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1550 (1989).
278. Canada is a party. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is Not
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instrument in the same sense as the U.N. Convention. Moreover, under
accepted rules of international law, certain aspects of conventions may bind
even non-signatories to the extent that some or all of their provisions reflect
customary international law,279 i.e. legal norms to which states adhere
through a sense that they are legally bound to do so. 2M Although the United
States may not be bound by a mere U.N. resolution adopting a declaration of
principles, to the extent that such principles reflect a general consensus on a
legal matter, they may constitute customary norms of international law by
which the U.S. would then be bound. Canada is a party to the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child but has only signed the Hague
Convention. 2sI The United States has signed both the U.N. Convention and
the Hague Convention but has not ratified either.'
Whether the United States is bound by the norms enunciated in these three
documents is not the point. The point is that the United States should find
reason to respect and protect the right of a child to be raised by his or her
biological parent when that parent is willing, able, and fit to do so from birth.
This international norm is reflected by a combined reading of these three
documents. The existence of the international norm provides the United States
with a solid foundation of over seventy years of international children's rights
jurisprudence on which to base a safer, better domestic approach to protection
of the bond between biological parents and their children.
All three of the above instruments reflect a consensus that the best place
for a child is within his or her biological family. There are also various
expressions that support my formulation that a child's right to be raised by a

a Party, Status on Convention on theRights of the Child, Jun. 23, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1469 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Recent Actions]. The United States has signed but not
ratified. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Conf. on Treaties, 2d Sess.,
May 23, 1969, art. 18, at 291, U.N. Doe. AIConf.39/27 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], a state that has signed a treaty subject to ratification is obliged
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
279. Only states that consent to be bound are obligated under a convention. Vienna
Convention, supra note 278, at 291. However, an agreement, in whole or in part, may codify
customary international law or become customary law over a period of time. States that have not
consented to be bound by a convention are nonetheless bound by customary international law.
For example, the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, yet its provisions bind
the United States as customary norms of international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324, cmt. e (1987). The Vienna Convention
itself recognizes in Article 38 that third parties may be bound by a rule set forth in a treaty that
is a customary rule of international law.
280. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 102(2) (1987) (defining customary international law).
281. See DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supranote 179 and accompanying text; RecentActions,

supra note 278.
282. See DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supranote 179 and accompanying text; RecentActions,
supra note 278.
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biological parent depends on the parent's willingness, ability, and fitness to
raise the child from the moment of birth. The wording in each instrument
differs, but each acknowledges that the parent-child bond is not absolute. Each
contains language limiting the primacy of the parent-child bond in some way,
indicating that it is not always possible or appropriate for a child to be raised
by biological parents. The following discussion of the three major children's
rights instruments will address how each supports the right of a child to be
raised by a biological parent and then how each supports my formulation that
the right depends upon willingness, ability and fitness to care for the child
from the moment of birth.
The U.N. Declaration states in Article 3 that "[t]he first priority for a
child is to be cared for by his or her own parents."' This language
establishes both the primacy of the biological relationship and the fact that it
is not absolute. Only when care by the child's own parents is unavailable or
inappropriate should alternative care such as adoption be considered. 2" Of
course, one may argue that biological parental care is inappropriate where a
child has lived for a significant period of time with prospective adoptive
parents and has developed attachments that would cause pain and detriment if
broken. The answer to that argument lies elsewhere in the Declaration. In
addition to the biological primacy reflected in Article 3, Article 13 states that
"[tihe primary aim of adoption is to provide the child who cannot be cared for
by his or her own parents with a permanent family."' While domestic law
adherence to these principles would not necessarily avoid conflicts between
biological and prospective adoptive parents, it would greatly lessen the chances
of prolonged interim placements, which raise conflicts that undermine the
integrity of a child's biological familial identity. Moreover, aspects of the
U.N. Convention protect against interim placement with prospective adoptive
parents when a biological parent asserts parental status.
The U.N. Convention has several articles creating legal protection from
the child'sperspectivefor the bond between child and biological parent. These
articles present the strongest case for my formulation that a child has the right
to be raised by a biological parent who is willing, able, and fit to do so from
birth. Article 7(1) recognizes that a child has the right, if possible, to know
and be cared for by his or her parents."e This recognition establishes the
primacy of the biological bond as well as limitations on the child's right. The
right to be cared for by one's parents only if they are willing, able, andfit to
carefor them derives from the language "as far as possible."' s

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

U.N. Declaration, supra note 273, at 1099.
See id. art. 4.
Id. at 1100.
U.N. Convention, supra note 274, at 1460.
As reflected in Convention history, the language "as far as possible" refers to many
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Article 3(1) declares that the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration in all actions concerning children; this principle extends to all
of the provisions of the Convention.2 s8 The right to be cared for by a
biological parent must give way where it would be detrimental to the child.
Under the best interest standard in Article 3, the right cannot extend to
situations where biological parents do not wish to raise children, are not able
to raise them, are not fit to raise them, or do not assume their parental
obligations and responsibilities from the initial point that a child needs care,
the moment of birth. In addition, without this crucial time limit on parental
assumption of care, a state party would, arguably, be in derogation of its
commitment to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival and
development of the child. 289
Finally, Article 2 mandates that state parties respect and ensure rights set
forth in the Convention without discrimination and irrespective of a child's
birth or other status. 21 From Article 2 and my interpretation of Article 7
within the context of Article 3, I conclude that legal protection of a child's
right to be raised by biological parents who can and will care for them
promptly and adequately must apply equally to children born within and
outside of marriage. Where biological parents do not wish to raise children,
are not able to raise them, are not fit to raise them, or do not assume their
parental obligations and responsibilities from the moment of birth, the state
must provide alternative care.29'

potential situations. The United States, together with the other nations comprising the drafting
group for this article, proposed the addition of this language. One reason was that some national
law (including U.S. law) did not allow adoptees in general to know their biological parents. When
the proposed language was challenged, the United States suggested changing it to "in the best
interest of the child." Although this was not accepted, some delegations joined in the consensus
on Article 7 with the understanding that the provisions should be interpreted in the best interest
of the child. Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child: Reportof the Working Group,
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., art. 7, at 278, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/48 (1989). While none
of the drafters expressed the meaning I am espousing, none of the drafting history excludes this
interpretation either. By "willing, able and fit" I mean a parent who is available, willing and
capable of providing a child with adequate care from birth.
288. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, art. 3(1), at 1459. The fact that this principle reaches
across all the Convention's provisions rests in its identification as a "general principle" applicable
to the entire Convention by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, established by Article 43
to evaluate state party reports to assess implementation of the Convention as per Article 44.
Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex III, at 16,
U.N. Doc. A/47/41 (1992). Recourse to this extrinsic key to interpretation is recognized by the
Vienna Convention, supra note 278, art. 32.
289. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, art. 6, at 1460 (emphasis added).
290. Id., art. 2, at 1459 (1989).
291. Neither Article 20 on parentless children/orphans nor Article 21 on adoption sets out
what that alternative should be. Somewhat contrary to other clear emphasis on family, Article 21,
for example, allows that intercountry adoption is to be considered only if suitable care (not
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Other articles in the U.N. Convention support the primacy of the
biological family bond and give direction as to its implementation in domestic
law. Article 9(1) mandates that state parties must not separate a child from his
or her parents againsttheir will without a determination under applicable law
and procedure that such a separation is necessary for the best interests of the
child (as where parents have neglected or abused a child or are living
separately, thus, necessitating a choice of residence for the child). 219
Article 8 respects the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including family relations, without unlawful interference. 2" Article 16
affords children, inter alia, the right to legal protection from arbitrary
interference with their families. 2' These three provisions provide support for
the proposition that domestic law should not allow a domestic authority to
place (or prolong placement of) a child with prospective adoptive parents
where a biological parent is in the process of assuming legal and actual
responsibility for the child.29 This interpretation as to placement would
prevent the conflict between the interest of the child in maintaining welldeveloped psychological bonds with de facto parents and the child's right and
interest to be raised by a biological parent. The best interest principle in

limited to family care) is not available in a child's country of origin. One could argue that a child
has a right to grow up in an altemativefamily environment. Preamble paragraph 6 states that a
child should grow up in a family environment. See id. at 1457. Numerous other articles
addressing aspects of the parent-child relationship also evidence the Convention's overwhelming
pro-family stance and lead one to infer that the last resort status of intercountry adoption is an
exception to the child's right to develop in a family environment. See Cynthia Price Cohen, The
Developing Jurisprudenceof the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. THOMAS L. RV. 1, 19-20 (1993).
This anomaly may be explained by the twin aims of the Convention to establish rights of identity
as well as rights of care and protection. Id. at 6, 8.
It is interesting to note that the hierarchy of alternative care in Article 21 of the U.N.
Convention that places intercountry adoption as a last resort even arguably after institutional care
in the country of origin does not appear in the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. An
intercountry adoption may take place after the "competent authorities" determine, after giving due
consideration to possibilities for placement in the state of origin, that an intercountry adoption is
in the child's best interest. Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(b), at 1139. I support the
Hague Convention position on the primacy of family care which does not relegate intercountry
adoption to a last resort.
It is also interesting to note that the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights
in calling for ratification and implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also
pointedly stressed "that the child for the full and harmonious development of his or her
personality should grow up in afamily environmentwhich accordingly merits broader protection."
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, June 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1668-69 (emphasis added).
292. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, at 1460 (emphasis added).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1462.
295. Id., art. 18(1), at 1463 (providing, inter alia, that parents or legal guardians have the
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child).
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Article 3(1) provides an internationally recognized structure on which to rest
the further, inherent safeguard: a biological parent must assume parental
responsibility from the moment of birth.296 Article 3(2) further supports this
reading by stating that the child has a right to protection of his or her wellbeing by the state. 219 I argue that it is necessary to condition the right to be
cared for by biological parents on the parent's willingness, ability, and fitness
to raise the child from the moment of birth in order to protect a child's wellbeing from the moment he or she needs care and protection.
One must acknowledge that Article 21, concerning adoption in those states
the practice, makes no explicit mention of any right to be raised
recognize
that
by a biological parent.2 9 One may, however, infer this right from Article 21, paragraph (a). Under that provision, a competent authority must
determine that the adoption is permissible in view of applicable law and the
child's status concerning parents, relatives, and legal guardians and that
informed consents, if required, shall have been given.
This provision in Article 21 must be read in conjunction with the cluster
of rights set out in preceding articles. 2' As the U.N. Convention establishes
protections for links between child and family and between child and
community, these links create a contextual penumbra which applies to the
entire Convention, including Article 21. These protected bonds comprise rights
of membership in one's original family and national identity.3" Penumbral
rights of membership stem from all the previously discussed articles that
protect a child's link to his or her family, nationality, and identity, including
Articles 7-9 and 16.301 The fact that Article 21 places intercountry adoption
as a last resort behind a foster or adoptive family or suitable care in the
296. This safeguard, inherent in Article 3, attaches even before the protections of Article 9
which apply only to certain legal separations of parent and child.
297. See U.N. Convention, art. 3(2), supra note 274, at 1459.
298. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, at 1464.
299. See Vienna Convention, supra note 278, art. 31(1) (providing that good faith
interpretation of a treaty rests on the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose) and art. 31(2) (specifying that context includes the entire text).
300. One sees the identification of membership rights in recent political science scholarship
on the Convention. See LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 94-122 (1995). While I strongly concur in Professor LeBlanc's characterization of a group
ofrights in the Convention as "membership rights," I would add the right to identity as expressed
in Article 8 which he does not choose to address in his work. Surely, the right to preserve one's
identity, including nationality, name, and family relations is central to the Convention's
recognition of rights inherent in membership in particular groups.
301. Article 7 gives the child the right to acquire a nationality and to know and be cared for
as far as possible by his or her family. Article 8 protects the child's right to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name, and family relations. Article 9 protects a child's right not
to be separated from his or her parents against the child's will unless it is in the best interest of
the child. Article 16 protects a child from arbitrary interference with his or her family. U.N.
Convention, supra note 274, at 1460-63.
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country of origin lends support for a reading that a child's nationality and
membership in his or her original family is implicit in the article. 302 Although Article 21 makes the best interest of the child the paramount consideration in adoption, the explicit and implicit requirements of the rest of the
article lead one to conclude that it is in the best interest of a child to be raised
by a biological parent if that parent can provide suitable care. 3 On this last
hook, one can hang the need to restrict the right of the child to membership
in his or her biological family to situations in which the biological parent
comes forward immediately to assume parental duties. 4
The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption directly addresses the
status of a child's relationship with biological parent(s). "[E]ach state should
take, as a matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child to
remain in the care of his or her family of origin."" Unfortunately, this
language appears in the preamble and does not rise to the status of explicit
obligation." ° Nevertheless, it gives contextual meaning to those provisions
that do contain explicit obligations.3 Article 4 requires, inter alia, that a
child be adoptable, that possibilities for placement in the country of origin
have been given due consideration, that intercountry adoption is in the child's
best interest, and that all persons whose consent is necessary for the adoption
have given it freely, in writing, and in the required legal form.30° These
requirements when read in the context of the preamble lead to the conclusion
that the Convention gives due and binding protection to a child's place in its
biological family. More importantly, Article 1 gives primacy to the fundamental rights of children. One of the objects of the Convention as set out in
Article 1, paragraph (a), is "to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry
adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respectfor his
or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law." 30 9 The

302. Id. at 1464.
303. Compare Article 21 on adoption with Article 20 on parentless children/orphans. The
latter provides thata child temporarily orpermanently deprived of his or her family environment,
or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, is entitled to
alternative care, including adoption. Based on the language of Article 20, one may argue that
adoption under Article 21 comes into play only when a biological parent is unavailable or unfit.
One may build on this proposition to argue that availability and fitness must be measured in a
timely fashion or the child's right to state protection for his or her survival and development
under Article 6 would be compromised. Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).
304. For a discussion of situations in which the biological parent does not know of the birth,
see infra text accompanying notes 333-34.
305. Hague Convention, supra note 7, preamble, at 1139.
306. While parties are bound by the language of the entire Convention, one must recognize
that the preamble sets out Convention goals and the text includes specific objects and obligations.
307. Vienna Convention, supra note 278, art. 31(2).
308. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at 1139-40.
309. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added).
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preamble specifically mentions the 1986 U.N. Declaration and the 1989 U.N.
Convention.31 Although these are certainly not definitive sources for a
child's fundamental rights as recognized in international law, they are greatly
persuasive positivist expressions. To the extent that these two U.N. instruments set out a right to be raised by one's biological parents, albeit circumscribed as discussed above, that right is incorporated by reference in the
Hague Convention.31'
There are other sources in international law that recognize fundamental
rights of children relevant to the present discussion. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognizes that all children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.3" To the extent that consent
standards favor married men over unmarried men and give children born
outside of marriage a lesser chance of being raised by a biological parent,
there is disparate treatment that is at odds with this right of equal social
protection. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights contains a similar non-discrimination provision,3 13 which supports a
similar argument. Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights also specifically addresses the rights of children.314 Each
child has the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status
as a minor without discrimination based, inter alia, on birth. The nondiscrimination part of this article lends itself to arguments similar to those
discussed above. Another argument arises, however, from a reading of
Article 24 in conjunction with Article 17. The latter guarantees, inter alia, a
right of legal protection against arbitrary interference with one's family.3 5
The state must afford special protection to minors from arbitrary interference
with their family status. What is arbitrary in the context of the adoption of
infants? Domestic courts grappling with the issue of timely consent from
unwed fathers most often balance the interests of the father against the child's
interest in developing in a stable family from birth, regardless of the biological
connection to that family. In the context of international law, however, one
can easily define the child's interest more broadly from a rights perspective.
This, in turn, would require that the calculation of what is arbitrary include

310. Id.
311. See id.
312. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25(2), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948). "'T]heUniversal Declaration is widely acclaimed as a Magna Carta of
humankind, to be observed by all the participants in the world arena." CHEN, supra
note 272, at 367.
313. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, art. 10(3), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
314. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 24,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
315. Id. at 177, 179.
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consideration of a child's right to be raised by his or her own parent(s).as far
as possible as well as a right to state protection of other aspects of his or her

well-being such as a stable environment in which to develop fully as a human
316

being.
The importance of the biological connection between parent and child is
not a terribly controversial proposition. 317 Even those who minimize its
ultimate importance deal with it as a serious issue. 31 1 Alone, the best interest
of the child, an equation with infinite variables and outcomes, is not controversial either. What is controversial is how to reconcile these two important
concerns in the context of the adoption of children born outside of marriage.
There has been much scholarly debate in the domestic law context in the

search for an answer.319 Compounding the problem with intercountry

316. See U.N. Convention, supra note 274, arts. 3(2), 7(1), at 1459-69, 1464 (1989)
(providing the right to protection of well-being and right to know and be cared for by parents).
317. What is often controversial is the reason why the biological connection is deemed
important or which connection is more important. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 223,
at 164-86 (1993) (recognizing the importance of biological families but arguing that idealizing
biological relationships stigmatizes adoptive relationships and undermines adoption); Mary E.
Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parents:FeministApproaches, 63 Soc. SERV. REv. 496 (1989)
(supporting traditional rules favoring maternal control of adoption).
318. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, Wat Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"?The Claims of
Biology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991) (rejecting biology in
favor of parental intent in the context of surrogacy and sperm donation).
319. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle For Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1476-80 (1991) (applying a broad redefinition of parenthood
in terms of mutual responsibility of parents to each other and to the child in adoptions and other
situations); Nancy E. Dowd, A FeministAnalysis ofAdoption, 107 HARv. L. REv. 913, 933-34
(1994) (advancing the proposition that where birth parents are not in a committed relationship,
mother-child relationship is the primary unit, and birth mother's decision regarding adoption
should be supported regardless of father's choice, unless birth mother opts to include him in
decision) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS (1993)); Nancy S. Erikson, The
FeministDilemma Over Unwed Parents'Custody Rights:The Mother'sRightsMust Take Priority,
2 J.L. & INEQ. 447 (1984) (favoring statutes that do not require the consent of unwed fathers to
adoption because they protect the best interest of the child and the reproductive freedom of
women); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children'sPerspectives
and the Law, 36 Aiz. L. REv. 11, 72-84 (1994) (emphasizing that the "best interest" standard
could not encompass Baby Jessica's multiple interests as a child, only the state's politicized
interests); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed FathersandAdoption:A TheoreticalAnalysisin Context,
72 TEx. L. REv. 967, 1013 (1994) (supporting the theory that the parental rights perspective can
incorporate child's interests); Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex
Equality: Gender-Neutralityand the Perpetuationof Patriarchy,95 COLUM. L. REV. 60 (1995)
(deciding custody of child should rest on judicial inquiry into father's timely assumption of
parental responsibility and mother's reasons for opposing custody with the best interest of the
child standard being inapposite); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed
Father'sRight to Raise His Infant Surrenderedfor Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 971 (1992)
(rejecting best interest evaluation of alternative custody arrangements in favor of primary right
of paternal custody absent showing of unfitness).
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adoption in contravention of the parenting pursuits of unwed fathers leads us
paradoxically out of the forest.
In a world of differing standards as to all aspects of adoption, there exists
a core of international legal principles shaping a body of law concerning
children's rights. From this perspective, we find a reason and basis to protect
the biological bond between the parent and child, because it is in the child's
best interest where the parent is willing, able, and fit to assume his role from
the moment of birth. This is not merely a circuitous international journey to
the same result we have reached in the United States from the paternal rights
perspective. By establishing the right of a child to be raised by a biological
parent who is willing, able, and fit to assume parental responsibility from the
moment of birth, the law resolves an apparent conflict between the constitutional rights of unwed fathers and the best interests of their children. This
apparent conflict has prompted challenges to the institution of adoption. 3'
By showing how the rights and interests of fathers and children coincide,
rather than conflict, I reinforce the institution of adoption to achieve its basic
purpose: providing permanent homes for children who would otherwise be
homeless.321 By solving a domestic adoption law problem through the norms
of international children's rights, I also achieve a broader purpose: generating
momentum for a fusion of international and national law that may surpass the
limitations of each realm and create a stronger set of children's rights. The use
of international law as a springboard for a newly energized domestic jurisprudence of children's rights avoids the limitations and pitfalls of domestic
parental rights analysis and offers hope for a set of newly defined children's
rights that are equal to the complexity of life, yet free from the confines of
traditional family structures and national boundaries. 3"

320. See Hollinger, supra note 229, at 55-56.
321. See id. at 56 (stating this as the explicit purpose of adoption).
322. For a theoretical basis for children's rights as well as a defense of their importance, see
John Eekelaar, The Importanceof Thinking That Children Have Rights, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS
AND THE LAW 221 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1992). "The strength of the rights formulation is
its recognition of humans as individuals worthy of development and fulfillment .... And to
recognize people as having rights from the moment of their birth continuously into adulthood
could turn out, politically, to be the most radical step of all." Id. at 234. Eekelaar sees rights as
consistent with responsibility between persons and between generations, two of the most common
criticisms of rights-based thinking. Id.; see Bartlett,supranote 249; Woodhouse, supranote 250.
For a critique of children's rights as politically useless to a powerless group that is
fundamentally different than oppressed adult groups that may use rights to apply rhetorical
pressure, see Onora O'Neill, Children'sRights and Children'sLives, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND
THE LAW 24, 39-40 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1992) (arguing theoretical difficulties of
fundamental rights theories).
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D. The Possible Contours of a Child's Right Inherent in the BiologicalBond
Before and After Adoption
In attempting to define through international law a child's right to be
raised from birth by a willing, able, and fit biological parent, we merely begin
to shape a set of rights inherent in the biological bond. In the adoption context
of the present article, we can sketch broad contours around which further work
can develop a more focused image.
To understand the fundamental nature of the right inherent in the
biological bond, we must first explore the dimensions of that bond. Why is it
of fundamental importance and due the most sensitive and solicitous legal
protection? Leaving aside the mystery of the bond in the religious sense that
is really up to each individual to define, I would define the secular importance
of the bond in one word: "history." A child's biological parents embody his
or her history. They represent the child's cultural, social, genetic, religious,
political, ethnic, and racial identity. They are one key to his or her sense of
place in the world. Children, like adults, have individual and group identities.
Unlike adults, children must develop their understanding of their identities as
they develop in other ways. They must learn their history in order to make
informed choices about their adult paths through life. They may embrace it or
reject it, but they must be allowed to know it. The law must not underestimate
the importance of a sense of place to a child's development.
When a child is adopted he or she becomes a member of a unique, ever
growing group: individuals with two identities. One identity stems from
adoptive parents, and the other flows from birth parents. It is the failure of
adoption, that statutory creature of the modern, western, industrial era,i 3u to
give full recognition to this fact that has caused so much trauma to many
adoptees and all of their parents. It is admittedly difficult for a child to deal
with the complexities of such a unique situation. Growing up is sufficiently
difficult for children with only one set of parents. It is understandable that the
law has chosen attachment to one set of parents, one family, one group, and
one identity as the best course. Adoptees, however, do not spring from the
head of Zeus.
The right to one's history encompasses the right to be free of the
psychological and developmental trauma created by separation from it. The
right to develop fully as a human being" also encompasses the right to be
323. While adoption predates the nineteenth century, it was first introduced in the United
States as a statutory departure from the English common law in Massachusetts in 1851. Jamil S.
Zainaldin, The Emergence ofa ModernAmerican FamilyLaw: Child Custody, Adoption, and the
Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1041-45 (1979). In contrast, certain Islamic
societies today do not recognize adoption in the same sense. See, e.g., discussion of a paper
submitted by a representative of Bangladesh during the drafting of the Question of a Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Report of the Working Group, supra note 287.
324. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, art. 6(2), at 1463 (providing that states shall ensure
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free of the trauma of other separations such as those from one's actual, as
opposed to historical or biological, family. The law must evolve to prevent or
lessen, as far as is possible, any conflicts between these twin strands of the
right to develop. Adoption is an institution of enormous social, individual, and
group benefit. Intercountry adoption, if properly handled and insulated from
its potential and actual abuses through, for example, the Hague Convention's
rules, presents both added cross-cultural benefits and threats. The loss of a
child's name, family relations, and other attributes of individual identity
protected under the U.N. Convention 3 assumes greater proportions when
it includes the loss of one's nationality, culture and language as well. The
benefits to the receiving culture and family are increased and the loss to the
child is lessened if the child's history is protected and preserved in some
manner after adoption. 3"
The fundamental importance of one's history has been recognized in
international instruments. In fact, a preeminent expert on the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child has noted one radical departure by that Convention
from previous expressions of children's rights: the inclusion of what she terms
"individual personality rights" in addition to previously recognized rights to
care and protection. 2 7 Cynthia Price Cohen characterizes Article 8's right
to identity as an expression of a newly formulated individual personality
right.32 Though some human rights instruments contain clauses aimed

to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child).
325. Id. at art. 8.
326. In her passionate arguments against the myth ofthe superiority ofbiological families and
the inferiority ofadoptive families, Elizabeth Bartholet, supra note 223, at 164-86, acknowledges
the importance of biological families but deplores the stigmatization of adoptive families. She
holds adoptive families out as unique and valuable on many levels. "Adoption creates a family
that is connected to another family, the birth family, and often to different cultures and to
different racial, ethnic, and national groups as well. Adoptive families might teach us something
about the value for families of connection within the larger community." Id. at 186. Much of her
description of the stigmatization of adoption centers, however, on the "search movement," which
she characterizes as ignoring the benefits of adoption in its zeal to pierce the adoptive veil.
Together with the psychological* literature which Bartholet claims is based on negative
assumptions about adoption, the movement condemns the "flawed institution" over which
Bartholet rejoices. Earlier in the book Bartholet had taken a cautious stand toward the sealed
record system in adoption, arguing for a system of open records in which the parties may request
closure upon showing good cause (the opposite of the current system prevailing in most states).
Id. at 60. Her caution stemmed from her desire to save adoption as an institution from the
dangerous extreme politics of the search movement. Id. Thus, even adoption's most prominent,
scholarly champion seeks an accommodation between the values inherent in ties built upon
biology and those built upon adoption. Like Bartholet, I seek a world in which diversity of
families is recognized as innately valuable and in which the special nature of each kind of family
is recognized.
327. Cohen, supra note 291, at 6-8.
328. Id.
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specifically at preserving minority group language, culture, and religion,329
other clauses (such as Article 8 of the U.N. Convention) exist, which are of
a more general applicability.33 The Hague Convention on Intercountry
Adoption specifically requires that state authorities preserve information held
by them concerning the child's origin, particularly the identity of the biological
parents. 3 1 The Hague Convention further requires only that a state provide
access to this information insofar as is permitted by that state's laws.33
In situations where the biological parent such as an unwed father does not
know of the birth and cannot come forward to assume his responsibilities at
birth, protections exist for the child's right to maintain a connection with his
or her father even though an adoption may proceed. Article 7 of the U.N.
Convention safeguards the child's right to know his or her parents as far as
possible.333 The Convention does not require that information about birth
parents be made public, but it does not prohibit disclosure. 34 National
legislation allowing an adoptee access to information about the identity of her
biological parents would carry out the spirit of Article 7. If the state wished
to protect the privacy of any parent desiring nondisclosure, it could do so
while allowing unwed fathers who learn of their paternity too late to assume
parental duties in the best interest of the child to register their wish to allow
their children to know them when they reach adulthood. This balance would
protect the child's interests in the stability of his or her adoptive family which
may be threatened by the intrusion of the biological father at an earlier time.
Of course, the law could allow the adoptive family to choose earlier disclosure
as they are in the best position to know how such knowledge of the child's
biological father would affect the individual child's development.
Most adoption law in the United States currently favors non-disclosure,
absent a compelling reason or mutual consent.33 5 Through recognition of the

329. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 314, art. 27,

at 179.
330. It is interesting to note that the Canadian delegation to the Working Party for the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child accepted the language of what became Article 21 on
adoption (previously Article 11) during the second reading in 1988-1989 with the explicit proviso
that it be interpreted to incorporate language in Article 20 (previously Article 10) requiring that
due regard be given to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background. Question

ofa Convention on the Rights of the Child:Reportof the Working Group, supranote 287, art. 8,
at 278.
331. Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 30(1), at 1143.
332. Id. art. 30(2).
333. U.N. Convention, supra note 274, at 1460.
334. The U.S. delegation to the drafting sessions withdrew its proposal to permit access to
adoption records only under court order in light of the absence of a disclosure requirement in the

draft convention. Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child:Report of the Working
Group, supra note 287.
335. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (opening of sealed
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centrality of the child's right to his or her history under international law, the
United States should move toward adoption that mandates access to information regarding an individual's history prior to adoption.336 If a child has the
right to know her birth parents at an appropriate time and to learn the history,
culture, and group identity that flows through them, we must start with access
to information. We should move toward a system that conditions adoption on
the birth parents' willingness to waive their privacy rights and allow their
biological children to know their identities. Of course, much more thought
must be given to the ramifications of such an approach and the appropriate
protections that may be needed.337 Nevertheless, if we look at adoption from
the perspective of children's rights inherent in the biological bond both before
and after adoption, we see that access to identity is the best possible course.
Summarizing the possible contours of the rights inhering in the biological
bond, one sees at the very least that a child should have the right to the
following before adoption:
(1) to be raised by a biological parent but only if that parent is ready,
willing, and able to assume parenthood from the moment of birth;

records and intermediary access to biological parent only upon showing of serious medical or
psychiatric need); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4138-c (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1996)
(establishing registry for disclosure by mutual consent of biological parents and adoptees). The
1994 Uniform Adoption Act is consistent with the law of every state concerning
(1) confidentiality of adoption proceedings, (2) confidentiality of all records pertaining to the
proceedings after the final decree, (3) sealing of court records, (4) sealing original birth
certificates and issuing new ones, and (5) allowing a limited exception to the general rule of
confidentiality through a judicial finding of good cause. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 6 & cmt.
(1994), 9 U.L.A. 79-84 (Supp. 1996).
336. I am arguing for far more than mere access to health-related information which is, of
course, a minimum objective. Although states are moving toward reform of the sealed record
system for the purposes of disclosure of health-related information in limited circumstances, even
this limited reform is controversial. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil:A
BlueprintforLegislativeReform of theDisclosureofHealth-RelatedInformation in Adoption, 70
N.C. L. REV. 681 (1992) (providing a comprehensive overview and program for reform). I am
not, however, arguing for the transition to open adoption as the norm. "Open adoption" refers
to arrangements in which the birth parents are known to the adoptive family or they maintain an
ongoing role in the child's life. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 26. While open adoption should
be a choice, it is a system fraught with potential dangers for everyone involved, most notably the
child. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 223, at 128-29 (postulating risks of open adoption).
337. I am aware of the possible disincentive this may prove to be for women contemplating
placing their children for adoption. For this reason alone, further work is needed to explore this
direction in the law. Feminist critics of open adoption stress that society must remove the stigma
attached to unwed pregnancy before it removes anonymity of the mother from the process.
Frances Olsen, Children'sRights: Some FeministApproaches to. the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW 192-220, 201 (Philip Alston et
al. eds., 1992). Children may not be better off if anonymous adoption is cut off as an option for
young, relatively powerless women. Id.
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(2) to state assistance in avoiding separation trauma from biological
parents;
(3) to state assistance in maintaining a connection with biological parents;
and
(4) to maintain his or her own history through his or her biological
parents.
A child should have the right to the following after adoption:
(1) to maintain a connection to his or her own history through the identity
of his or her biological parents; and
(2) to know the identity of his or her biological parents at an appropriate
time.
V. CONCLUSION

The use of intercountry adoption to avoid the delay and uncertainty
inherent in the state of the law on paternal rights of unwed fathers presents a
specific subset of the problem in this unsettled area. If the United States
ratifies the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, we will be taking one
step toward eliminating the problem by foreclosing the incentives for
intercountry flight created by differing subnational approaches to the issue of
an unwed father's consent to the adoption of his biological child. The
receiving state would have to verify that the consents required by the law of
the originating state accompany the intercountry adoption. If the United States
ratifies the Hague Convention, we have a unique opportunity to forge new
mechanisms to adjudicate consent in a speedy manner to avoid unnecessary
trauma to the child. The arguments about unnecessary bureaucracy338 recede
in persuasive force when weighed against the benefits offered by such mechanisms. These mechanisms offer benefits not only to intercountry adoption but
also to domestic adoption. Domestic law may draw on the Hague model, as
suggested in this article, to travel a considerable distance toward solving the
difficult, emotional and politically fraught problem of how and when an unwed
father must consent to an adoption. In this way, international law presents a
platform for domestic law reform.
This is not the only role for international law in this area. Regardless of
whether the United States ratifies the Hague Convention, there still remains
more distance to travel toward resolution of the legal and social problem.
Uncertainty in U.S. domestic law as to just when an unwed father has the right
to veto an adoption by withholding his consent provides incentive to consider
how to settle the law and perhaps even harmonize it, at least in this hemi-

338. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 223, at 160-62. This 1993 work predates the final
Hague Convention and does not assume that the Convention will itself create unnecessary
bureaucracy.
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sphere. By looking to the rights of children under international law, rather
than the competing rights of parents under domestic law, we refocus adoption
on its primary beneficiaries, avoid the dangers to children and society of
elevating parental rights, and infuse the domestic jurisprudence of children's
rights with global insights. Under international law, children have rights
inhering in the biological bond with their parents and the national, cultural,
and historical identity they represent. They also have rights to develop fully
as human beings. If we combine those rights in the domestic context of
adoption, we find that the law should prevent or lessen the trauma of
separation from one's biological parents at various stages, both before and
after adoption. Arbitrary destruction of an individual's history violates a
fundamental human right. The best interest of the child will always be to
preserve that history as an inalienable, irreplaceable resource for human
development. Access to one's history should not prevent adoption, nor should
adoption prevent access to one's history. The law must protect both.
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